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Islâm,
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Recite! In the name of your Lord! [Qur'ân, Sûra 96:1]
Islâm, , is the religion founded by the Prophet Muh.ammad. The word is sometimes said to mean "peace," but it is salâm, , that is the word for peace. Islâm means "submission, resignation," i.e. to the will of God. Both are from the same root, slm, , "to be safe and sound, unharmed," and many other meanings. This is related to Hebrew shalôm, "peace," and the Ancient Egyptian root snb, "health." The Dâru-l'Islâm, the "House of Islâm," means the predominantly Islâmic part of the world, especially the part covered by Islâmic states. Outside the Dâru-l'Islâm is the Dâru-lH.arb, the "House of War"; and it was the traditional duty of Islâmic rulers to extend the House of Islâm into the House of War.
This expansion of the Dâru-l'Islâm was the Jihâd, , the Holy War. Someone who does the Jihâd is a Mujâhid, (pl. Mujâhidûn, ). Jihâd is now often said not to mean, or not primarily to mean, Holy War but merely a moral and spiritual "struggle" for perfection. The root (jhd, ), indeed, does mean "to endeavor, struggle," etc., but also "to fight." Different derivatives of the root, as with slm, are used for different purposes. Ijtihâd, , is from the same root and can also mean "struggle," but it is mainly used to mean "independent interpretation" on a point of Islâmic Law, i.e. independent of legal precedent (following precedent is taqlîd, ). It is no distortion of Jihad to say that it means "Holy War." Indeed, in the Middle Ages it was an important question whether Islâm could be properly practiced in a non-Muslim state. Even though Islâm was supposed to tolerate "People of the Book," which originally meant Jews and Christians but in practice came to include Zoroastrians and even, unevenly, Hindus, this was only in a subordinate position (dhimma, the status of the dhimmî, the tolerated non-believer) -- Muslims being "tolerated" in a non-Muslim state was against the divine order.
The treatment of Jihâd in public discourse does not always seem honest. Thus, the former History International cable channel (now "H2") recently (12/10/08) aired a show called "Secrets of the Koran." This was copyrighted 2006 and so perhaps was a repeat showing. The show explained the ideology of Jihâd as the result of the Crusades, and otherwise positively affirmed that Muslims are only supposed to use force in self-defense. But to suppose such a thing with any kind of superficial consistency, major events in Islamic history were then ignored or glossed over. The Omayyads were never even mentioned during the show, and the original Islamic conquest of Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, although illustrated with maps, was discussed in no detail and often only characterized as "spreading the Word of Islam." This was a grave distortion when the original Islamic Conquest was not intended to "spread the Word" or obtain converts at all. Islam was initially viewed as a religion just for Arabs.
Most terrible evils has Romania suffered from the Arabs even until now. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (d.959) quoting The Chronicle of Theophanes (c.815) [De Administrando Imperio, Greek text edited by Gy. Moravcsik, Dumbarton Oaks Texts, 1967, 2008, p.94] |
Other comparisons have been made between the characters of Muh.ammad, Jesus, and Moses, since Muh.ammad commanded armies, had multiple marriages, etc. Muh.ammad, indeed, had the responsibilities of rule, with a hostile enemy, Mecca, nearby. This involved battles. Jesus wasn't in any such position. His Kingdom, as he said, was not of this world. Moses did have the responsibilities of rule, though actual fighting didn't begin until the Israelites crossed the Jordan. Moses didn't go with them, and Joshua then handled the military business. Since Joshua was instructed by God to annihilate the people he found in the Promised Land, Muh.ammad comes off rather well in comparison, since the war with Mecca ended in a negotiated settlement where the only losers were the idols in the Ka'aba, (though there had been a fair amount of killing in the conflict, and Muh.ammad had in the meantime expelled the Jews from Medina). As for his marriages, Muh.ammad seemed to have been genuinely devoted to his wife Khadîja, an older widow whom he married after helping her run her business. Khadîja was one of the first who believed that Muh.ammad was actually receiving a divine revelation. He married no other until after she died. I do not know how to judge the subsequent marriages. At least some of them seem to have been honorary, with the widows of fallen companions. His favorite wife, 'Â'isha, was betrothed to him at six. It was she who laid him to rest in the floor of their house in Medina, and the last person to set foot there for many centuries, as the Prophet's Mosque was built around it. One might think the Prophet was simply heir to some of the understandable temptations of power, but this explanation is generally not allowed in Islâmic tradition, since the Prophet is viewed as necessarily morally perfect. That is hardly necessary. The Bible does not present Moses as morally perfect -- indeed, God prohibits his entry into the Promised Land as a punishment.
At right we have been seeing an image of the Angel Gabriel leading the Prophet Muh.ammad on the miraculous horse Buraq, from a 15th century Persian miniature. I include this because of the recent controversy over cartoons of the Prophet published in October 2005 in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. By early 2006, Islamic radicals managed to stir up riots in many Islâmic countries over the cartoons, featuring attacks on Denmark, the EU, and Christians. It was positively affirmed by the radicals that images of the Prophet are absolutely forbidden in Islâm and that the cartoons were an intolerable slander against Islâm -- except that the Danish cartoons were really very mild and the radicals had included some other cartoons, nastier ones, that had nothing to do with the Danish newspaper. They were obviously looking for a pretext, not honestly expressing any reasonable protest. Not only that, but what they positively affirmed was not true. Although images have definitely been frowned upon in Islâmic history, and often absent altogether, there is nevertheless no lack of them. A favorite theme was the Prophet's "Night Journey," when he was taken up in a dream to heaven and hell, as we see in the image here. The whole episode thus exposes the extremism of modern Islâmic fundamentalism. This is not the Islâm of The Thousand and One Nights or 'Umar Khayyâm. It is a fascism that derives from the least humane and tolerant varieties of Islâmic law, often that of the H.anbalî school favored by the Wahhâbîs of Sa'udi Arabia, not to mention the dangerous, militant, and reactionary insanity of revolutionary Irân. Apologists then accuse Westerners of hostile misunderstandings Islâm, when the disagreement of the apologists is with the radicals, whose own interpretations often have substantial support in Islâmic jurisprudence -- if indeed the apologists really do disagree with the radicals: they often seem disingenuous to a suspicious degree.
A new political crime has been added to Leftist demonology. This is "Islamophobia." The precedent for this term seems to be "homophobia," and both are about equally confused in their etymology. A "phobia" is a fear, so "Islamophobia" should mean "fear of Islam," as "homophobia," with "homo" used as a prefix for "homosexual," should mean "fear of homosexuals." This is not the way these words are used, however. "Homophobia" and "Islamophobia" are supposed to mean hatred of homosexuals, and of Islam, respectively, where this hatred is the morally (and perhaps legally) culpable expression of bigotry and hostility.
In "homophobia" this was already a tendentious reading of traditional attitudes towards homosexuality. Certainly there are people who hate homosexuals, and are even willing to commit violence against them, and it might be reasonable to imagine people fearing homosexuals, if they think that the innocent can be "converted" to homosexuality, or that homosexuality is a decadent and disruptive influence in society. But in general, "homophobia" is usually just applied to people who, largely for religious reasons, and without any particular personal hostility or tendency to violence, judge that homosexual practices are immoral. This is rarely addressed in an honest way in public debate, where "liberal" opinion is in the business of smearing traditional religion (or at least traditional Christianity). Instead, "homophobia" has become a political slogan and a slur, whose meaning and implications are left unarticulated, and which itself becomes an expression of hostility and contempt for religious traditionalists.
It is then ironic that "Islamophobia" should follow in the footsteps of this usage, taking advantage of its device as a political slogan and a slur, when in the modern world the source of some of the most intense persecution of homosexuals is from militant Islam. When the President of Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, was invited to speak at Columbia University (at the time of his appearance before the United Nations), many of the anti-American elite were certainly hopeful of hearing a good diatribe against Imperialism and the United States. Unfortunately, a naive, or perhaps hopeful (or both), participant then asked Ahmadinejad about the status of homosexuals in Iran. The answer was that there are no homosexuals in Iran. An informed questioner would have already known that they are hanged as quickly as they can be identified. The sentiment that homosexuals should be executed had also been previously expressed by a British Imam, without consequences, despite laws in Europe that could construe such an opinion as an incitement to a hate crime.
How absurd this can all get was revealed recently when a "gay pride" parade was cancelled in London, not because of anti-gay threats from Muslims -- which had actually been expressed -- but purportedly in "solidarity" with opposition to anti-Muslim "Islamophobia," which was said to be the moral equivalent of homophobia. Why a desire to assert solidarity between anti-homophobia and anti-Islamophobia should result in a "gay pride" parade being cancelled was left unexplained -- as, indeed, one would expect the opposite reaction, that the "gay pride" parade, with an anti-homophobia theme, would be combined with a parade asserting an anti-Islamophobia theme. Obviously, the fear of violence against the parade from Muslims led to its cancellation; but the organizers, in a sort of anticipatory Stockholm Syndrome, decided to dislay their political correctness by identifying with those from whom they feared violence. There are few more bizarre contortions evident in contemporary politics.
Ironic or not, the use of "Islamophobia" is an attempt to demonize those who actually do fear Islam,
Jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim. Anwar al-Awlaki (d.2011) |
There would have been a right way and a wrong way to do this project. The right way would have reflected the concern of well-meaning Muslims to dissociate their religion from the 9/11 attacks and to express their dismay and mortification that the terrorists should have invoked Islam to justify the atrocities. The mosque as an expression of contrition for the damage done by vicious co-religionists would have at least been a step in assuaging the justifiable fears of all the targets of terrorism. Indeed, there should be such a mosque at Ground Zero, in conjunction with facilities related to the religions of all the victims of 9/11. There were, after all, many innocent Muslims who were killed at the World Trade Center. The project of the mosque should be making clear that the "martyrs" of 9/11 were the victims of the terrorists, not the terrorists themselves (for whom, of course, a "martyrdom operation" means a suicide attack).
The wrong way to promote the project, however, is the way it has actually been done. The leader of the effort, the Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, himself was on record as blaming the United States for the 9/11 attacks and refused to distance himself from terrorist organizations like Hamas. He and his wife have responded to objections to the project with accusations of "Islamophobia," by which they clearly mean, not reasonable "fear of Islam," but a bigoted and intolerant hostility for Islam. Thus, they give every indication of militancy and would leave any reasonable person with the impression that the mosque is not an attempt at reconciliation -- which would be ill served by calling most Americans bigots -- but is in fact a Jihad Victory Mosque whose purpose is to promote an Islamist agenda as close as possible to the place were militant Islamists killed almost 3000 victims. This makes the project an insolent gesture that both insults America and makes use of the anti-American "useful idiots" who are eager to cooperate in their own destruction.
Imam Rauf appeared on "The O'Reilly Factor" on 8 May 2012 and announced that he was no longer involved with the Park Place mosque, citing some kind of disagreements with other backers. It would be nice to know who those other backers are and what Rauf's differences were with them. Nevertheless, in the interview Rauf keep talking as though he were still planning the project. Perhaps he was just talking about his general goals. Bill O'Reilly mentioned that he had long ago said that if Rauf would appear on "The Factor" and renounce Terrorism, O'Reilly himself would take up a hammer and help build the mosque. Rauf brought along a drawing of a hammer, that he said was from his wife, and gave it to O'Reilly. I did not notice, however, that Rauf ever did actually renounce Terrorism during the interview. Perhaps my attention wandered and I missed it.
We need to begin to suspect the motives of anyone willing to use the term "Islamophobia." The Left admires militant Islam for its expressions of hostility to America, capitalism, "imperialism," and democracy -- i.e. for something that apologists want to deny that Islam actually represents. The Left, of course, has no respect for Islam as a religion or for its traditional religious or social values. All of these, from the subordination of women to the ferocious treatment of homosexuals, are actually anathema to elite political correctness. But opportunism trumps honesty, and this is as true for the Islamists as for Western Leftists. Both are pleased with the alliance, however Unholy to either ideology, as the old Arab saying (from the days of tribal vendettas) is well remembered -- "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."
We see this alliance in various examples of what can only be called wishful thinking, if not outright delusion. Thus, Hollywood personality Rosie O'Donnell, a homosexual herself, drew considerable attention to her assertion that Christian fundmentalists are as bad as Islamic terrorists (along with claims that the 9/11 attack was an "inside job," a favorite trope of the Left). Since "just as bad" doesn't seem to square with the absence of Christian suicide bombers, mass terror attacks, or large popular organizations that preach Christian Holy War through terror and combat, O'Donnell seemed more than a little out of touch with reality. Not as extreme but just as revealing was the speculation by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg that the perpetrator of the May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing was, "Homegrown, maybe a mentally deranged person or someone with a political agenda that doesn’t like the health care bill or something." It looked like Bloomberg was hoping that the bomber was one of his political enemies (i.e. opposed to socialized medicine), rather than the kind of Muslim radical that he turned out in fact to be. Bloomberg loudly supports the ground zero mosque. Meanwhile, the City of New York has attempted to prevent the rebuilding of the St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church, which was actually crushed by the falling South Tower of the World Trade Center on 9/11. Bloomberg has not spoken out on this issue.
The courageous Ayaan Hirsi Ali grew up in Somalia, lived in Saudi Arabia and Kenya, and fled an arranged marriage, and Islam, to the Netherlands. There she worked with Theo van Gogh on the movie about women in Islam that got him assassinated on the street. She was elected to the Dutch parliament before her citizenship was revoked, probably because of the embarrassment she was causing to spineless Dutchmen like Ian Buruma (a Professor of "Democracy and Human Rights" at Bard College), who has publicly said that Ali is as much a fanatic (for freedom, human rights, and tolerance?) as the Islamists (for murder, terror, and intolerance?). If Buruma means that this is good, he has not done a good job of clarifying his intention.
Similarly, Ali has been confronted in interviews with the proposition that crimes are committed as much by Christians as by Muslims. Since the common crimes of Christians are rarely framed in terms of a Holy War against infidels, Ali naturally found the proposition more puzzling than anything else; and we are left with the impression of a kind of desperation on the part of the interviewers to deflect blame from Islam and to create the kind of "moral equivalence" that the Left promoted, in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. Most people see through this easily, although, as George Orwell said, nothing is so preposterous that an intellectual will not believe it. People like O'Donnell, Bloomberg, and Buruma know that they have the "useful idiot" intellectuals on their side.
Currently, the ugliest counter-examples to the good intentions of Muslims are the continuing attacks on Christians in Iraq, Pakistan, and especially in Egypt. Churches are looted, burned, demolished, and/or bombed. Christians in Iraq and Egypt are kidnapped and ransomed or tortured and murdered. Women and girls are kidnapped, forcibly converted to Islam, and "married" to Muslims against their will. Campaigns are conducted in Egypt that Christians families are holding their own girls "hostage" after they supposedly converted to Islam. The government of Egypt does not even allow churches to be built or repaired without its permission, which is effecively never given. Or, if it is, mobs often attack the churches, or even the whole Christian villages around them, during or after construction. On 24 November 2010, Egypt security forces actually stormed the St. Mary and St. Michael churches, which were under construction in Giza, occupying them and firing live ammunition at Coptic demontrators, killing at least four. The official complaint was that a permit for the construction had not been obtained, although actually it had. Either way, a paramilitary attack, shooting civilians, is not the reasonable response to people building churches.
The Western Press pays little attention to these atrocities, both because the Western secular elite, in the intelligentsia, academia, and the media, is hostile to Christianity, and generally kills stories about the persecution of Christians, and because the political Left is effectively an ally of Islamic Fascism. Since Egyptian state security forces fail to protect Christians and often appear to cooperate in their persecution, including this recent case of shooting Christian demonstrators, while the government-controlled Press promotes anti-Christian hysteria, this puts the lie to claims about the general tolerance, respect, and good-will that Islam is supposed to show towards other religions. That is not the practice on the ground in most Islamic countries, whether the Western Press reports it or not.
The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew & Babylonian
Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine
Philosophy of History
Political Economy
Index
- Introduction
- "Islamophobia"
- The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew & Babylonian
- The Prophet, 622-632 AD
- The Rightly Guided Caliphs, 632-661 AD
- The Shi'ite Imâms, 632-878 AD
- The Omayyad Caliphs, 661-750 AD
- The Abbasid Caliphs, 750-1258 AD
- The Aghlabids, 800-909 AD
- The T.âhirids, 821-873 AD
- The T.ûlûnids, 868-905 AD
- The Sâmânids, 819-1005 AD
- The S.affârid, 861-1003 AD
- The Ikhshîdids, 935-969 AD
- The H.amdânids of Aleppo, 944-1004 AD
- The Buwayid Amirs of Iraq, 945-1055
- The Qarakhânids, c.992-1212 AD
- The Ghaznawids, 977-1186 AD
- The Ghûrids, 1011-1215 AD
- Islâmic Rulers of Spain, 756-1492 AD
- Islâmic Rulers of North Africa, 789-1163 AD
- The Idrîsids of Morocco, 789-985 AD
- The Rustamids of Algeria, 778-909 AD
- The Aghlabids, 800-909 AD
- The Shi'ite Fatimid Caliphs, 909-1171 AD
- The Zîrids of Tunisia, 947-1163 AD
- The Hammâdids of Algeria, 1015-1152 AD
- The Murabit (Almoravid) Sult.âns, 1067-1147 AD
- The Muwahid (Almohad) Caliphs, 1147-1238 AD
- The Seljuk Great Sult.âns, 1037-1157 AD
- The Il Khâns, 1256-1353
- The Khâns of the Golden Horde
- The Ayyûbid Sult.âns, 1169-1252 AD
- Islâmic Rulers of North Africa, 1217-1659 AD
- The Marînid Amîrs of Morocco, 1195-1465
- The Wat.t.âsid Amîrs of Morocco, 1472-1554
- The Sa'did Sharîfs of Morocco, 1510-1659
- The H.afs.id Amirs, Caliphs, or Sult.âns of Tunisia, 1229-1574
- The Zayyânid or Ziyânid Amîrs of Algeria, 1236-1555
- The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, & Kings of Morocco, 1640-present
- The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia, 1705-1957
- The Keita Kings of Mali, 1230-1390
- The Si & Askiya Kings of Songhay, 1464-1592
- The Mamlûk Sult.âns of Egypt, 1252-1517 AD
- The Ottoman Sultâns & Caliphs, 1290-1924 AD, Maps and List of Emperors
- Shibânid Özbegs, 1438-1599
- Kazakhs, 1394-1748
- Toqay Temürids, 1599-1758
- Mangïts of Bukhara, 1747-1920
- The Shâhs of Iran, 1501-1979 AD
- Sult.âns of Delhi, 1206-1555
- Moghul Emperors, 1526-1540, 1555-1858
- Sult.âns of Malacca, 1403-1528
- Sult.âns of Johor, 1528-present
- Sult.âns of Acheh, c.1450-1903
- Yemen, 1230 BC-1962 AD
- Modern Islâm
- The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD
- The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD
- The Sanûsî Amîrs & Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD
- The Sult.âns of Oman and Zanzibar, 1754-present
- The Hâshimites, 1827-present
- The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, & Kings of Morocco, 1640-present
- The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia, 1705-1957
- The House of Sa'ûd, 1735-present
- The Sultans of Brunei, 1405-present
- Afghanistan, 1747-1973
- Prime Ministers & Presidents of Pakistan
- Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine
Philosophy of History
Home Page
Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
Islâm, 622 AD-present
The advent of Islâm, with Arab armies coming out of the practical equivalent of nowhere, was unforeseen and unforeseeable. It dramatically and permanently altered the history of both the Middle East and the Mediterranean world. Persia was eliminated for many years as an independent political or cultural force, and the revival of Romania was ended, with the Empire reduced from about 3/4 of its original extent, as restored by Justinian, to little more than 1/4, all that was left by the reign of Leo III.
THE PROPHET | |
---|---|
THE H.IJRAH ERA, THE ISLÂMIC HISTORICAL ERA | 16 July 622 AD |
28 April 1998 AD = 1419 Annô Hegirae | |
Muh.ammad, Peace Upon Him | 622-632 |
The Islâmic Era accompanies the Islâmic Calendar, which is purely lunar and cycles through the seasons every 32 or 33 years, a convenient provision when fasting is required during the daylight hours in the month of Ramad.ân -- neither Northern nor Southern hemispheres are stuck with Ramad.ân at times of either long or short days. Curiously, the 30 year cycle of the Islâmic calendar commensurates with the 19 year cycle of the Jewish calendar after 1368 solar or 1410 lunar Islâmic years. This puts the Islâmic Era in 622 at one full cycle after the beginning of the Era of Nabonassar in 747 BC. Another full cycle comes down to our time, in 1990. Anyone disposed to numerological portents are welcome to make of this what they will.
THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHS | |
---|---|
'Abû Bakr | 632-634 |
assumes title Khalîfah, "successor," to the Prophet | |
'Umar | 634-644 |
Roman Emperor Heraclius defeated at Yarmûk, 636; fall of Gaza, Antioch, Mesopotamia conquered from Persians, 637; Jerusalem surrendered, 638; Egypt invaded, 639; fall of Caesarea in Palestine, 640; Persians defeated, 642 | |
'Utman | 644-656 |
attacks in India, 644; Roman army destroyed in North Africa, but army withdraws, 647; Persia overrun, by 651 | |
'Alî | 656-661 |
The tolerance of the Arabs for any "People of the Book" seemed preferable, especially after the respect and consideration shown by the Caliph 'Umar when he entered Jersualem. The period of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs," who were all either fathers-in-law or sons-in-law of Muh.ammad, however, ended in some confusion. The murder of 'Uthman was blamed by his powerful Meccan relatives on 'Alî, who was unable to exert authority against them over all Islâmic territories. The "bloody shirt of 'Uthman" was thereafter considered a largely cynical ploy by the Omayyads to further their own cause, which soon did triumph at the death of 'Alî, whose sons were either bought off (H.asan) or killed (H.usayn).
Although the Omayyads were cousins of Muh.ammad, they definitely had the greater status at Mecca and were originally quite hostile (except for 'Uthman) to Islâm. The symbolic crowns in the diagram are for the Prophet and the Caliphs (Khalifah, "successor"). Only that for the Prophet is given with a nimbus, since for the Orthodox only he was divinely inspired and authoritative. The light blue nimbus for 'Alî indicates the Shi'ite belief that he and his descendants were divinely inspired and authoritative also (the Imâms). Modern families that trace descent to the Prophet or his family, like Kings of Hijaz, Iraq, and Jordan, call themselves Hâshemites.
THE SHÎ'ITE IMÂMS | ||
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1 | 'Alî | 632-661 |
First Cousin & Son-In-Law of the Prophet & Fourth Rightly Guided Caliph | ||
2 | H.asan | 661-669 |
3 | H.usayn | 669-680 |
Martyred at Karbalâ', 680 | ||
4 | 'Alî Zayn al-'Âbidîn | 680-712 |
5 | Muh.ammad al-Bâqir | 712-731 |
6 | Ja'far al-S.âdiq | 731-765 |
7 | Ismâ'îl | 765-760 |
Schism -- followers of Isma'il become the "Seveners" or "Ismailis," basis of Shî'ism of the Fatimids, the Assassins, and in India | ||
7 | Mûsâ al-Kâz.im | 765-799 |
8 | 'Alî al-Rid.â | 799-818 |
9 | Muh.ammad al-Jawâd | 818-835 |
10 | 'Alî al-Hâdî | 835-868 |
11 | al-H.asan al-'Askarî | 868-874 |
12 | Muh.ammad al-Muntazar al-Mahdî | 874-878 |
Disappears, 878 -- becomes the "Hidden Imâm," basis of "Twelver" & Iranian Shi'ism |
OMAYYAD CALIPHS | |
---|---|
Mu'âwiya I | 661-680 |
assumes caliphate at death of 'Alî, moves capital to Damascus; Arab aristocratic government; Siege of Constantinople, 674-677; attacks in India, 677 | |
Yazîd I | 680-683 |
Mu'âwiya II | 683-684 |
Marwân I | 684-685 |
Uqba ibn Nâfi' founds Qayrawân, 663/4; reaches the Atlantic, killed & Army annihilated by Berber Kusayla, 683 | |
'Abd 'al-Malik | 685-705 |
Builds the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, finished 691/692; Conquest of Armenia, 693; silver dirham & gold dinar first minted, 695; Fall of Carthage, 698, 705; H.assân ibn al-Nu'mân defeated by Berber (possibly Jewish) prophetess al-Kâhina (Dahiyah, Dahia, or Dhabba), driven out of North Africa, after 698; Kâhina defeated, Berbers convert, 702 | |
al-Walîd I | 705-715 |
Builds the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus, 706-715; Spain falls to Islâm, end of Visigoths, invasion of India, 711 | |
Sulaymân | 715-717 |
Siege of Constantinople, 717-718 | |
'Umar II | 717-720 |
Yazîd II | 720-724 |
Hishâm | 724-743 |
defeat, 725, & explusion, 737, from India; defeated by Khazars, Ardebil, 730; but defeated and subjected Khazars, 737-c.740 | |
al-Walîd II | 743-744 |
Yazîd III | 744 |
'Ibrâhîm | 744 |
Marwân II | 744-750 |
Abbasid revolution, Omayyads overthrown and massacred (except in Spain); end of Arab empire, 750; Battle of Talas, 751, T'ang Dynasty Chinese defeated, but no further advance into Central Asia |
In time, hostility against the Omayyads began to mount. The resentment of the non-Arabic second-class Moslems joined with the cause of the partisans of 'Alî, questioning the legitimacy of the regime and agitating against it. Also, later Omayyads sometimes seemed insufficiently interested in Islâm. Desert hunting lodges contained images much more Roman than Arab in inspiration, and one Caliph is supposed to have shot a copy of the Qur'ân to pieces out of resentment for its prohibition of wine.
When the storm broke, it was with astonishing ferocity. The entire Omayyad clan was exterminated. Only one prince escaped, to Spain, where an Omayyad regime endured. Elsewhere, the rebellion succeeded completely, bringing to power distant cousins of the Omayyads, the descendants of Muh.ammad's uncle 'Abbâs.
All Moslems now became (more or less) equal, and when the capital shifted to Baghbad, the influence of Persian civilization began to predominate over Roman. The Arabs lost their preeminence, and soon it was the rare Caliph who was not the child of a Persian or Turkish mother. As the Abbasids later declined, Arabia itself slipped from their hold, to become once again a political, if not a religious, backwater. The Arabs had bestowed their religion and their language on the civilization of the Middle East, but true Arabian Arabs would be politically insignificant until the discovery of oil in the 20th century gave them a geopolitical status beyond what any other asset would warrant.
The defeat of the Chinese at Talas was probably still a function of the momentum of Omayyad conquest. However, the overthrow of the Omayyads immediately deflated this momentum, and no further advantage was taken of the Chinese embarrassment -- at a time when the T'ang Dynasty had seen its best days and was on the verge of decline. Curiously, there seems to have been one long-term consequence of the battle of a very different sort. Reportedly, among the Chinese prisoners taken at Talas were artisans who knew how to make paper. What they were doing with a Chinese army in Central Asia, I don't know; but the significance of their craft was quickly recognized. Soon, the Abbasids founded paper mills in Baghdad and the industry quickly spread to Romania. Since parchment is more durable than paper, surviving books tend to be in that material; and the role of paper books in the Mediaeval book market is thus a matter of some uncertainty. That they existed, however, at least in Islam and Romania, is beyond doubt. Paper mills in Francia are first attested in Aragón in 1282.
The Arabic title , amîr, is important. Originally this just means "commander" and would be used for a general military officer, or even for the Caliph himself, the Amîru 'lMu'minîn, "Commander of the Faithful." The military commanders then become governors, and so amîr comes to mean "governor." The governors then drift into independence, and amîr then can reasonably be translated "prince." The first truly independent Amirs were the Omayyads in Spain, who were content with the title for a century and a half. Later many Abbasid governors drifted into independence, and the "Emirate" becomes the basic domain of independent Islâmic statehood. A title that is mostly not seen for many centuries is malik, "king." This is not really an Islâmic title of rule, though it can be a proper name and is very close to one of the Names of God, Mâlik, "Owner, Master, Possessor." Every day, Muslims invoke God as the Mâliku lYaumi dDîni, "Possessor the of the Day of Judgment." Malik has largely been a post-colonial title, often an ephemeral one. The old Persian word for King, however, Shâh, occurred with some frequently in Iran and India. What becomes the classic Islâmic title of rule, Sult.ân, "Power, Dominion, Authority," begins with the Seljuks.
ABBASID CALIPHS | |
---|---|
'Abdullâh asSaffâh. | 750-754 |
'Abdullâh al-Mans.ûr | 754-775 |
Muh.ammad al-Mahdî | 775-785 |
Mûsâ al-Hâdî | 785-786 |
Hârûn arRashîd | 786-809 |
mythic and cultural height of Abbasid Caliphate; Idrîsids break away in Morocco, 789; first paper mill established in Baghbad, 794-795; great earthquake in Egypt, Alexandria & Pharos Lighthouse damaged, 797 | |
Muh.ammad al-'Amîn | 809-813 |
'Abdullâh al-Ma'mûn | 813-833 |
Muh.ammad al-Mu'tas.im | 833-842 |
moved to Samarra with Turkish guard | |
Hârûn al-Wâtiq | 842-847 |
Ja'far al-Mutawakkil | 847-861 |
assassinated by Turkish guard | |
Muh.ammad al-Muntas.ir | 861-862 |
Ah.mad al-Musta'în | 862-866 |
Muh.ammad al-Mu'tazz | 866-869 |
Muh.ammad al-Muhtadî | 869-870 |
Zanj Rebellion, 869-883 | |
Ah.mad al-Mu'tamid | 870-892 |
returned to Baghdad Recognizes King of Armenia, 885 | |
Ah.mad al-Mu'tad.id | 892-902 |
'Alî Muktafî | 902-908 |
Ja'far al-Muqtadir | 908, 908-929, 929-932 |
Muh.ammad al-Qâhir | 929, 932-934 |
Ah.mad arRâdî | 934-940 |
loss of authority | |
Ibrâhîm al-Muttaqî | 940-944 |
'Adbullâh al-Mustakfî | 944-946 d. 949 |
under Shi'ite Buwayids, 945 | |
al-Fad.l al-Mut.î' | 946-974 |
'AdulKarîm at.T.â'î' | 974-991 |
Ah.mad al-Qâdir | 991-1031 |
'Abdullâh al-Qâ'im | 1031-1075 |
under Seljuks; 1055, grants title of Sult.ân | |
'Abdullâh al-Muqtadî | 1075-1094 |
Ah.mad al-Mustaz.hir | 1094-1118 |
al-Fad.l al-Mustarshid | 1118-1135 |
al-Mans.ûr arRâshid | 1135-1136 |
Muh.ammad al-Muqtafî | 1136-1160 |
Yûsuf al-Mustanjid | 1160-1170 |
al-H.asan al-Mustad.î' | 1170-1180 |
Ah.mad anNâs.ir | 1180-1225 |
Independent from Seljuks, 1194 | |
Muh.ammad az.Z.âhir | 1225-1226 |
al-Mans.ûr al-Mustans.ir | 1226-1242 |
'Abdullâh al-Musta's.im | 1242-1258 |
1258, killed by Mongol Khân Hülägü; end of Abbasid Caliphate; Mamlûks set up Abbasid puppet caliphate in Egypt; continues until Ottoman conquest |
Politically, the Abbasid era then becomes a story of fragmentation, as governors become autonomous and then rival powers arise. At first, only Spain escaped the Abbasid revolution.
OMAYYAD AMIRS OF SPAIN | |
---|---|
'AbdurRah.mân I | 756-788 |
grandson of the Caliph Hishâm; escapes to Spain from the massacre of the Omayyads | |
Hishâm I | 788-799 |
al-H.akam I | 799-822 |
'AbdurRah.mân II | 822-852 |
Muh.ammad I | 852-886 |
al-Mundhir | 886-888 |
'Abdullâh | 888-912 |
Line continues with the Omayyad Caliphs, 912-1031 |
THE AGHLABID AMIRS OF TUNISIA, ALGERIA, & SICILY | |
---|---|
Ibrâhîm I | 800-812 |
'Adbullâh I | 812-817 |
Ziyâdat Allâh I | 817-838 |
Invasion of Sicily, 827 | |
al-Aghlab | 838-841 |
Muh.ammad I | 841-856 |
Sack of Ostia & Rome, 846 | |
Ah.mad | 856-863 |
Ziyâdat Allâh II | 863 |
Muh.ammad II | 863-875 |
Capture of Malta, 870 | |
Ibrâhîm II | 875-902 |
Capture of Syracuse, 878 | |
'Abdullâh II | 902-903 |
Ziyâdat Allâh III | 903-909 |
Conquest by the Fatimids, 909 |
THE T.ÂHIRID AMIRS OF KHURÂSÂN | |
---|---|
T.âhir I | 821-822 |
T.alh.a | 822-845 |
T.âhir II | 845-862 |
Muh.ammad | 862-873 |
Occupied by S.affârids |
THE T.ÛLÛNID AMIRS OF EGYPT | |
---|---|
Ah.mad ibn T.ûlûn | 868-884 |
Khumârawayh | 884-896 |
Jaysh | 896 |
Hârûn | 896-904 |
Shaybân | 904-905 |
Recovered by Abbasids |
THE SÂMÂNID AMIRS OF TRANSOXANIA AND KHURASAN | |
---|---|
Ah.mad I | governor of Farghâna & Soghdia, 819-864 |
Nas.r I | 864-892 |
Ismâ'îl | 892-907 |
Ah.mad II | 907-914 |
Nas.r II | 914-943 |
Nûh. I | 943-954 |
'Abd al-Malik I | 954-961 |
Mans.ûr I | 961-976 |
Nûh. II | 976-997 |
patron of Ibn Sîna (d.1037) | |
Mans.ûr II | 997-999 |
'Abd al-Malik II | 999-1000 |
Ismâ'îl II | 1000-1005 |
Conquest by Qarakhanids & Ghaznawids, 1005 |
THE S.AFFÂRID AMIRS OF SÎSTÂN | |
---|---|
Ya'qûb | 861-879 |
Overthrow T.âhirids, 873 | |
'Amr ibn al-Layth | 879-900 |
T.âhir | 900-909 |
al-Layth | 909-910 |
Muh.ammad | 910 |
al-Mu'addal | 910-911 |
Sâmânid Occupation, 911-912 | |
'Amr ibn Ya'qûb | 912 |
Sâmânid Occupation, 912-914 | |
[local commanders] | 914-923 |
Ah.mad | 923-963 |
Khalaf | 963-1003, d.1009 |
Tâhir | regent, 963-969 |
Ghaznawid Occupation, 1003 |
Although Orthodox, the S.affârids rejected the need for recognition by the Caliphal authority -- but the second amir was eventually recognized as governor of several Irânian provinces. S.affârid power, however, was soon checked by the Sâmanîds, who themselves claimed descent from the Sassanid Shâhs and patronized the revival of Persian as a literary language in the epic of Firdawsî (940-1020), the Shâh-nâma (Book of Kings -- nâma is today used to mean "letter" or "paper," while Arabic kitâb is used for "book"). This is now regarded as the Irânian National Epic and is noteworthy for the dignity accorded to Zoroaster as a Prophet of God. The book contains a striking dream image, of four men pulling at the corners of a square cloth, but not tearing it. This is interpreted to mean that the four men are the Prophets Moses, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad, while the cloth is the Religion of God. That Zoroaster figures along with Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad is an unmistakable clue that we are dealing with a Persian source. Otherwise, Muslims do not go out of their way to include Zoroaster, certainly not on equal footing, with the other three. Also, as a statement about religion it is un-Islâmic and subversive in that it implies an equality, despite the conflict, between the four attendant religions. The Islâmic view is that only Muhammad delivers an uncorrupted revelation. Both the S.affârids and Sâmanîds eventually fell to the coming wave of Turkish regimes. The Sâmânids were thus the last Irânian domain in Transoxania.
THE IKHSHÎDID AMIRS OF EGYPT | |
---|---|
Muh.ammad ibn T.ughj al-Ikhshîd | 935-946 |
Ûnûjûr | 946-961 |
'Alî | 961-966 |
Kâfûr al-Lâbî, Regent | 966-968 |
Ah.mad | 968-969 |
Conquest by the Fatimids, 969 |
After the Abbasid revival, the Ikhshîdids began the process of drifting out of Abbasid control again but then found themselves trying to stop the triumphant Fatimids, ultimately unsuccessfully.
THE H.AMDÂNIDS OF ALEPP0 | |
---|---|
'Alî I SayfudDawla | 944-967 |
patron of al-Fârâbî (d.950) | |
Sharîf I Sa'dudDawla | 967-991 |
Antioch lost to Romania, 969 | |
Sa'îd Sa'îdudDawla | 991-1002 |
'Alî II & Sharîf II | 1002-1004 |
Lu'lu' | Regent, 1002-1004 |
1004-1009 | |
Vassal of Fatimids, 1004 | |
Mans.ûr Murtad.âdDawla | 1009-1015 |
Fled to Romania, 1015 |
THE BUWAYID (BÛYID) AMIRS OF IRAQ | |
---|---|
Ah.mad ibn Bûya | 945-967 |
Bakhtiyâr | 967-978 |
Fanâ Khusraw | 978-983 |
Marzubân | 983-987 |
Shîrzîl I | 987-989 |
Fîrûz | 989-1012 |
Abû Shujâ' | 1012-1021 |
H.asan | 1021-1025 |
Shîrzîl II | 1025-1044 |
Marzubân | 1044-1048 |
Khusraw Fîrûz | 1048-1055 |
Overthrown by Seljuk Great Sult.âns, 1055 |
The Buwayids were Shi'ite Princes who dominated the Abbasid Caliphs for a century. Although they fostered a flourishing of Shi'ite scholarship and theology, they never tried to suppress the Orthodox Caliphs altogether, so the Abbasids continued to exercise their minimal religious authority under the regime. Nevertheless, the Caliphs and the Orthodox were not too happy about this and so, at least initially, welcomed the coming of the Orthodox Seljuks. The appeal of Shi'ism in Irân, evident here, later becomes the basis of Irânian nationalism in the Safavids. This is the nadir of the Abbasid Caliphate, with its secular power and prestige completely eclipsed.
The origin of the name of Baghdâd, , is itself obscure. The dâd element looks like it is from the Indo-European verb "give," which we also see in Persian names like Mehrdâd, "given by Mithra." With the first element, it could be Middle Persian "god," bag (Sanskrit bhaga), or Middle Persian "garden," bâgh (also bâgh in Punjabi, which looks like a borrowing from Persian -- the "gh" is not a voiced aspirate stop, as in Sanskrit or Hindi, but the fricative that is indicated, but not always pronounced, in Indian, i.e. Hindi and Urdu, borrowings from Persian or Arabic). My guess is that "garden" is more likely right, so that the meaning is probably "a garden is given," rather than "given by God."
The complete genealogy of the Alids, Omayyads, and Abbasids is in The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 1B, [edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, & Bernard Lewis, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp.731-733]. Unfortunately, the diagrams contain no dates. Much the same information, with dates, is in The Arabs by Anthony Nutting [Mentor Books, 1964, p.202-203]. I have not found a complete genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasids. According to Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [pp.7 & 9], the relationship of the two lines is uncertain anyway. Now, however, I have received from Derek Whaley a genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasids which he has assembled, with a connection to the main Abbasid line. Much of this can be confirmed in Bosworth, and I provide it, with a couple of additions and corrections, here, formerly just in a popup, but now connected up with the rest of the Abbasids. There is no reason why the Abbasid line should not have continued in Constantinople, but instead they disappear from history. I do not know whether they died out, the Ottomans exterminated them, or they just disappeared into obscurity.
Below we see Islâm in the year 1000 AD. The days of secular authority of the Abbasid Caliphs are now gone. The Caliphs are dominated by the Buwayid princes. The center of Islamic power and culture now seems to be in Egypt, with the Caliphate of the Shi'ite Fatimids. The Fatimids even control the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. Representing Orthodoxy, the Omayyads in Spain have also declared a Caliphate. In the East, we now have the advent of the Turks, with the Ghaznawids beginning their inroads into India. This will permanently introduce Islam into India, even as these Turkish states mean the disappearance of Iranian people from Central Asia.
THE IDRÎSID CALIPHS OF MOROCCO, 789-985 AD | |
---|---|
Idrîs I | 789-791 |
Idrîs II | 791-828 |
Muh.ammad al-Muntas.ir | 828-836 |
'Alî I H.aydara | 836-849 |
Yah.yâ I | 849-863 |
Yah.yâ II | 863-866 |
'Alî II | 866-? |
Yah.yâ III al-Miqdâm al-Jût.î | ?-905 |
Yah.yâ IV | 905-925 |
Tributary to Fatimids, 917 | |
al-H.asan al-H.ajjâm | 925-938 |
al-Qâsim Gannûn | 938-948 |
Ah.mad Abu'l-'Aysh | 948-954 |
al-H.asan | 954-974, 985 |
Annexed by Fatimids, 985 |
The Rustamids of Algeria, 778-909 AD | |
---|---|
'Abd ar-Rah.mân | 778-788 |
'Abd al-Wahhâb | 788-824 |
Aflah. Abû Sa'îd | 824-872 |
Abû Bakr | 872-874 |
Muh.ammad Abû'l-Yaqz.ân | 874-894 |
Yûsuf Abû H.âtim | 894-895, 899-? |
Ya'qûb | 895-899, ?-907 |
Yaqz.ân | 907-909 |
Fatimid Conquest, 909 | |
The Hammâdids of Algeria, 1015-1152 AD | |
H.ammâd | 1015-1028 |
al-Qâ'id Sharaf ad-Dawla | 1028-1054 |
Muh.sin | 1054-1055 |
Buluggîn II | 1055-1062 |
al-Nâs.ir | 1062-1088 |
al-Mans.ûr | 1088-1105 |
Bâdîs | 1105 |
al-'Azîz | 1105- 1121/24 |
Yah.yâ | 1121/24- 1152 |
Almohad Conquest, 1152 |
The Zîrids of Tunisia, 947-1163 AD | |
---|---|
Zîrî | Governor, 947-972 |
Yûsuf Buluggîn I | 972-984 |
al-Mans.ûr | 984-996 |
Bâdîs Nâs.ir ad-Dawla | 996-1016 |
Division of Tunisia & Algeria, 1015 | |
al-Mu'izz | 1016-1062 |
Breaks with Shi'ism & Fatimids, 1049; invasion of Banu Sulaym and Hilâli, 1051 | |
Tamîm | 1062-1108 |
conquest of Sicily by Normans, 1061-1091 | |
Yah.yâ | 1108-1116 |
'Alî | 1116-1121 |
al-H.asan | 1121-1148; Governor, 1148-1163, d.1168 |
conquest by Normans then Almohads, 1148 |
In the East the Khârijites had been a violent and revolutionary heresy, denying that those who violated the moral strictures of Islâm were even Muslims. In the East, they were suppressed amid great slaughter. In North Africa, the sect finds a nationalistic base among the Berbers, creating a mass movement, beginning with the Rustamids, such as didn't exist in the East. In Morocco, under Idrîs I ibn 'Abdallâh, a great-grandson of H.asan, the son of 'Alî, we get another movement. With his background, it is perhaps not surprising that Idrîs both claimed the Caliphate and established Shi'ism. He also founded the Madînat Fâs, the city of Fez. Eventually the Idrîsids fragmented and then fell to the Fatimids, who inherited the mantle of the Shi'ite Caliphate. Years later, an Idrîsid branch, the H.ammûdids became one of the Reyes de Taifas of Spain.
The other two North African dynasties given here (perhaps a bit out of sequence) were successors to the Fatimids. These began with Zîri ibn Manâd, a Berber retainer of the Fatimids. His son, Buluggîn, was appointed Fatimid governor of Ifrîqiya. As with the Abbasids, so with the Zîrids. They began to drift away into autonomy. In 1015, Bâdîs ceded the western part of the territory to his uncle H.ammâd, after a falling out over H.ammâd's shift in allegiance to the Abbasids. Thus we get a division between Algeria and Tunisia. The Fatimids didn't much worry about autonomy in North Africa, but they were outraged when the Amîr al-Mu'izz changed his own allegiance to the Abbasids -- even while the Hammâdids had returned to Shi'ism. The Fatimids were too weak at this point (1049) to visit their own vengeance, so they directed instead two Arab tribes, the Banu Hilâl and the Banu Sulaym, to do the job for them (1051). The result was an unorganized pillaging, which mainly just ruined the countryside and hinterland. The Zîrids and Hammâdids moved down to the coast and built fleets. This was useful against the Norman conquest of Sicily but ultimately, by 1091, the Normans succeeded, ending the history of Islamic Sicily that had begun with the Aghlabids. Eventually the Almohads ended both regimes and unified North Africa again.
THE FATIMID CALIPHS | |
---|---|
al-Mah.dî | 909-934 |
Shi'ite (Sevener) Caliphate established in North Africa to rival Orthodox Abbasid Caliphate | |
al-Qâ'im | 934-946 |
al-Mans.ûr | 946-952 |
al-Mu'izz | 952-975 |
Egypt occupied, Caliphate removed to new city, al-Qâhirah -- Cairo -- 969 | |
al-'Azîz | 975-996 |
al-H.âkim | 996-1021 |
az.Z.âhir | 1021-1035 |
al-Mustans.ir | 1035-1094 |
al-Musta'lî | 1094-1101 |
al-'Âmir | 1101-1130 |
collateral line assumes throne; no longer considered to be Shi'ite Imâms | |
al-H.âfiz. | 1130-1149 |
az.Z.âfir | 1149-1154 |
Apostacy of & Zirids, 1049; dispatch of Banu Sulaym and Hilali into Tunisia, 1051 | |
al-Fâ'iz | 1154-1160 |
al-'Âd.id | 1160-1171 |
dies natural death as Egypt passes to Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb S.alâhu dDîn |
OMAYYAD CALIPHS OF SPAIN | |
---|---|
'AbdurRah.mân III | 912-961 |
al-H.akam II | 961-976 |
Hishâm II | 976-1008 & 1010-1012 |
Muh.ammad II | 1008-1009 |
Sulaymân | 1009 & 1012-1017 |
('Alî ibn Hamûd) | 1017-1021 |
'AbdurRah.mân IV | 1021-1022 |
(al-Qasim) | 1022 |
'AbdurRah.mân V | 1022-1023 |
Muh.ammad III | 1023-1024 |
(Yahya ibn 'Alî) | 1024-1027 |
Hishâm III | 1027-1031 |
One reason that 'AbdurRah.mân III may have proclaimed himself Caliph, besides the general decline of the Abbasids in power the prestige, was the new Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa. While the Fatimids claimed descent from the Prophet's daughter Fât.ima, as descendants of the Seventh Imâm, Ismâ'îl, there is little confidence and less evidence for this genealogy. What it gave the Fatimids, however, was a claim to the Shi'ite Imâmate. This was an Apocalyptic movement, coincidentally approaching the Millennium on the Christian calendar. When the Fatimids occupied Egypt in 969, it did look like they might be the heirs of all of Islâm. The new capital founded in Egypt, al-Qâhirah, "the Victorious," although at the place of the Roman fortress of Babylon (of all things) and the Omayyad city of Fust.ât. (Old Cairo), now becomes the classic Islâmic capital of Egypt, Cairo. While Fatimid control soon extended into the Levant and to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, this proved to be the Fatimid high water mark. In the Fatimid decline, North Africa broke away, the Crusaders arrived in the Levant, and the Fatimid succession itself passed to a collateral line that lost the numinous status of Shi'ite Imâm. The last Fatimid Caliph, a sickly child, was allowed to die a natural death by the occupier of Egypt, Saladin, before the regime was deposed.
THE MULÛK AT-T.AWÂ'IF, REYES DE TAIFAS | |
---|---|
The Jahwarids of Cordova, Qurt.ubah | |
Jahwar ibn Muh.ammad ibn Jahwar | 1031-1043 |
Muh.ammad ar-Rashîd | 1043-1058 |
'Abd al-Malik Dhu's-Siyâdatayn al-Mans.ur | 1058-1069 |
'Abbâdid conquest, 1069 |
The map shows 21 Reyes de Taifas in 1030, but at different times there were up to 39 of them. Only some of the more significant and durable are listed in the tables here. Already, both León and Navarre are larger than any Islamic state. Spain would never again be unified by a native Islamic state. This disunity was, of course, a golden opportunity for the Christian kingdoms; and the fall of Toledo to León and Castille in 1085 is significantly considered the beginning of the Christian Reconquista. The Moslem position was restored by the advent of the Almoravids, who then absorbed all the Taifa states. Toledo, however, which had been the capital of the Visigoths and was still considered the heart of Spain, was never recovered.
Murcia, Mursiyah | |
---|---|
Khayrân as.-S.aqlabî | 1012/13-1028 |
Zuhayr as.-S.aqlabî | 1028-1038 |
'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir al-Mans.ûr of Valencia | 1038-1045 |
Mujâhid al-'Âmirî | 1045-c.1049 |
The T.ahirids | |
Ah.mad ibn T.âhir | c.1049-1063 |
Muh.ammad ibn T.âhir | 1063-1078 |
'Abbâdid conquest, 1078 | |
The 'Abbâdids of Seville, Ishbîlyah | |
Muh.ammad I ibn Ismâ'îl ibn 'Abbâd | 1023-1042 |
'Abbâd Fakhr ad-Dawla al-Mu'tad.id | 1042-1069 |
Muh.ammad II al-Mu'tamid | 1069-1091, d.1095 |
Almoravid conquest, 1091 | |
The H.ammûdids of Málaga, Malaka | |
'Alî ibn H.ammûd | 1014/15-1017 |
al-Qâsim I al-Ma'mûn | 1017-1021, 1022-1026 |
Yah.yâ I al-Mu'talî | 1021-1022, 1026-1036 |
Idrîs I al-Muta'ayyad | 1036-1039 |
Yah.yâ II al-Qâ'im | 1039-1040 |
al-H.asan al-Mustans.ir | 1040-1043 |
Idrîs II al-'Alî | 1043-1046, 1053-1056 |
Muh.ammad I al-Mahdî | 1046-1052 |
Idrîs III as-Sâmî | 1052-1053 |
Muh.ammad II al-Musta'lî | 1056 |
Zîrid conquest, 1056 | |
The Zîrids of Granada, Gharnât.ah | |
Zâwî ibn Zîrî as.-S.anhâjî | 1013-1019 |
H.abbûs ibn Mâksan | 1019-1038 |
Bâdîs al-Muz.affar an-Nâs.ir | 1038-1073 |
'Abdallâh ibn Buluggîn | Granada, 1073-1090 |
Tamîm ibn Buluggîn | Málaga, 1073-1090, d.1095 |
Almoravid conquest, 1090 |
Aft.asids of Badajoz, Bat.alyaws | |
---|---|
'Abdallâh ibn Muh.ammad ibn al-Aft.as | 1022-1045 |
Muh.ammad al-Muz.affar | 1045-1068 |
Yah.yâ | 1068 |
'Umar al-Mutawakkil | 1068-1094 |
Almoravid conquest, 1091 | |
The 'Âmirids of Valencia, Balansiyyah | |
'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir al-Mans.ûr (Sanchuelo) | 1021-1060 |
'Abd al-Malik Niz.âm ad-Dawla | 1060-1065 |
Occupied by Dhu'n-Nûnids, 1065-1076 | |
Abû Bakr al-Mans.ûr | 1076-1085 |
'Uthmân al-Qâd.î | 1085 |
Yah.yâ II Dhu'n-Nûnid | 1085-1092 |
Rodrigo Díaz, El Cid | 1094-1099 |
Almoravid conquest, 1102 | |
The Dhu'n-Nûnids of Toledo, T.ulayt.ulah | |
Ismâ'îl Dhu'r-Riyâsatayn az.-Z.âfir | 1018-1043 |
Yah.yâ I Sharaf ad-Dawla al-Ma'mûn | 1043-1075 |
Yah.yâ II al-Qâdir | 1075-1080, 1081-1085, d.1092 |
Occupied by Aft.asids, 1080-1081; Conquest by Leon & Castille, 1085 | |
The Banû Mujâhid of Denia and Majorca | |
Mujâhid al-'Âmirî al-Muwaffaq | c.1012-1045 |
'Alî Iqbâl ad-Dawla | 1045-1076 |
conquest by Hûdids, 1076 | |
The Tujîbids of Saragossa, Saraqus.tah | |
al-Mundhir I al-Tujîbî | governor, 1010-1023 |
Yah.yâ al-Muz.affar | 1023-1029 |
al-Mundhir II Mu'izz ad-Dawla | 1029-1039 |
'Abdallâh al-Muz.affar | 1039-1040 |
The Hûdids of Saragossa | |
Sulaymân ibn Hûd al-Judhâmî | 1040-c.1047 |
Sulaymân Tâj ad-Dawla | c.1047-1049 |
Ah.mad I Sayf ad-Dawla | 1049-1082 |
Yûsuf al-Mu'tamin | 1081-1083 |
Ah.mad II al-Musta'în | 1083-1110 |
'Abd al-Malik 'Imâd ad-Dawla | 1110 |
Almoravid occupation, 1110-1118; occupation by Aragón, 1118-1130 | |
Ah.mad III Sayf ad-Dawla | 1130-1146 |
Conquest by Aragón, 1146 |
MURÂBIT. (ALMORAVID) SULT.ÂNS | |
---|---|
Yûsuf ibn Tâshufîn | 1061-1107 |
Crosses over into Spain, defeat of Alfonso VI at Zallâqa, 1086 | |
'Alî ibn Yûsuf | 1107-1142 |
Tâshufîn ibn 'Alî | 1142-1146 |
Ibrâhîm ibn Tâshufîn | 1146 |
Ish.âq ibn 'Alî | 1146-1147 |
Almohad conquest, 1147 |
THE GHAZNAWIDS | |
---|---|
Sebûktigin | governor in Ghazna for Sâmânids, 977-997 |
Ismâ'îl | 997-998 |
Mah.mûd of Ghazna | 998-1030 |
Invasions of India, 1001-1024 | |
Muh.ammad | 1030-1031, 1040-1041 |
Mus'ûd I | 1031-1040 |
Mawdûd | 1041-1048 |
Mus'ûd II | 1048 |
'Alî | 1048-1049 |
'Abd ar-Rashîd | 1049-1052 |
Farrukhzâd | 1052-1059 |
Ibrâhîm | 1059-1099 |
Mas'ûd III | 1099-1115 |
Shîrzâd | 1115-1116 |
Malik Arslan Shâh | 1116-1117 |
Seljuk Occupation, 1117 | |
Bahrâm Shâh | 1117-1150, c.1152-1157 |
Ghûrid Occupation, 1150-c.1152 | |
Khusraw Shâh | in Lahore, 1157-1160 |
Khusraw Malik | 1160-1186, c.1191 |
Ghûrid Conquest, 1186 |
THE QARAKHÂNIDS | |
---|---|
'Alî Arslan Khân | Great Qaghan |
Ah.mad Arslan Qara Khân | 998-1017 |
Overthrow of Sâmânids, 1005 | |
Mans.ûr Arslan Khân | 1017-1024 |
Muh.ammad Toghan Khân | 1024-1026 |
Yûsuf Qadïr Khân | 1026-32 |
'Alî Tigin Bughra Khân | Great Qaghan in Samarkand, c.1020-1034 |
Muh.ammad Arslan Qara Khân | c.1042-c.1052 |
Ibrâhîm Tabghach Bughra Khân | c.1052-1068 |
Nas.r Shams al-Mulk | 1068-1080 |
Khid.r | 1080-1081 |
Ah.mad | 1081-1089 |
Ya'qûb Qadïr Khân | 1089-1095 |
Mas'ûd | 1095-1097 |
Sulaymân Qadïr Tamghach | 1097 |
Mah.mûd Arslan Khân | 1097-1099 |
Jibrâ'îl Arslan Khân | 1099-1102 |
Muh.ammad Arlsan Khân | 1102-1129 |
Nas.r | 1129 |
Ah.mad Qadïr Khân | 1129-1130 |
H.asan Jalâl ad-Dunyâ | 1130-1132 |
Ibrâhîm Rukn ad-Dunyâ | 1132 |
Mah.mûd | 1132-1141 |
Defeat of Seljuks, Qara-Khitaï Occupation, 1141 | |
Ibrâhîm Tabghach Khân | 1141-1156 |
'Alî Chaghrï Khân | 1156-1161 |
Mas'ûd Tabghach Khân | 1161-1171 |
Muh.ammad Tabghach Khân | 1171-1178 |
Ibrâhîm Arslan Khân | 1178-1204 |
'Uthmân Ulugh Sult.ân | 1204-1212 |
Khwârazm Conquest, 1212 |
The "Black" (Turkish qara) Khâns displace the Sâmânids in Transoxania and begin the process whereby the region, now Turkestan, becomes predominately Turkish. Vassals of the Seljuks and then of the Buddhist Qara-Khitaï, the khâns survive until absorbed in the brief empire of the Khwârazm Shâhs.
SELJUK GREAT SULT.ÂNS | |
---|---|
T.ughrul I Beg | 1037-1063 |
1055 frees Caliphs from Shi'ite Buwayids; granted title of Sult.ân | |
Alp Arslan | 1063-1073 |
Destroys Roman army, captures Emperor Romanus IV, Battle of Manzikert, 1071 | |
Malik Shâh I | 1073-1092 |
Sult.âns of Rûm independent, 1092 | |
Mah.mûd I | 1092-1094 |
Berk Yaruq (Barkiyâruq) | 1094-1105 |
Malik Shâh II | 1105 |
Muh.ammad I Tapar | 1105-1118 |
Ah.mad Sanjar | in Khurâsân 1097-1157 |
1118-1157 | |
Defeat by Qara-Khitaï, driven out of Transoxania, 1141 | |
Mah.mûd II | in Iraq 1118-1131 |
Dâwûd | in Iraq 1131-1132 |
T.ughril II | in Iraq 1132-1134 |
Mas'ûd | in Iraq 1134-1152 |
Malik Shâh III | in Iraq 1152-1153 |
Muh.ammad II | in Iraq 1153-1160 |
Great Sultanate breaks up, 1157 | |
Sulaymân Shâh | in Iraq 1160-1161 |
Arslan Shâh | in Iraq 1161-1176 |
T.ughril III | in Iraq 1176-1194 |
Conquest by Khwârazm Shahs, 1194 |
Under Alp Arslan and Malik Shâh there was considerable intellectual and cultural achievement, in part encouraged by their great Vizir, Niz.âm al-Mulk. This included the greatest of Islamic philosophers, al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111), and the mathematician, astronomer, and poet 'Umar Khayyâm (d.1122). Khayyâm's fatalism, although with its Islamic overtones, may owe more to an Iranian sensibility, as would what seems to be his worldiness and even cynicism ("Of all that one should care to fathom, I was never deep in anything but Wine," as FitzGerald translated it). Harsher times and considerably less intellectual daring were ahead.
The map below shows Islâm at the death of Malik Shâh I (1092). The Seljuk Great Sultanate, so vast (at least in Asia) and formidable, will now fragment, weaken, and disappear. When the First Crusade arrives in 1098, neither Seljuks nor Fatimids are in any shape to resist it. There is some irony in this, since the Crusades were initiated in response to the Seljuk conquest of Anatolia, which was then partially recovered for Romania. The extent of Seljuk control over the Ghaznawids is unclear, but the Ghûrids are just beginning their rise against their suzerains, whom they will replace (1186). While the Ghûrids fall to the Khwârazm Shâhs (1215), their slave vassals in India found the Sultanate of Delhi. The Almoravids have crossed over to Spain, defeated the Christians (1086), and delayed the Reconquista. When the Fatimid vassals, the Zirids of Tunisia, converted to Orthodox Islâm (1049), the Fatimids rid themselves of some troublesome Arab tribes by directing them to North Africa. This was a sterile revenge which gained the Fatimids nothing, but did contribute to an Arabization of North Africa.
THE GHÛRIDS | |
---|---|
Abû 'Alî | Ghaznawid vassal, 1011-c.1035 |
'Abbâs | |
Muh.ammad | c.1059 |
H.asan | |
H.usayn I | 1100-1146 |
Sûrî | 1146-1149 |
Sâm I | 1149 |
H.usayn II | 1149-1161 |
Muh.ammad Sayf ad-Dîn | 1161-1163 |
Muh.ammad Bahâ' ad-Dîn | Sult.ân, 1163-1203 |
Muh.ammad Mu'izz ad-Dîn | Ghazna, 1173-1203 |
Sult.ân in Ghûr & India, 1203-1206 | |
Mah.mûd Ghiyâth ad-Dîn | 1206-1212 |
Yïldïz Mu'izzî Tâj ad-Dîn | governor of Ghazna, 1206-1215 |
Sâm II Bahâ ad-Dîn | 1212-1213 |
Khwârazm Vassals | |
Atsïz 'Alâ ad-Dîn | 1213-1214 |
Muh.ammad Shujâ' ad-Dîn | 1214-1215 |
Khwârazm Conquest, 1215 |
THE KHWÂRAZM SHÂHS | |
---|---|
Ekinchi ibn Qochqar | Seljuk governor, 1097 |
Arslan Tigin Muh.ammad Qut.b adDîn | 1097-1127 |
Qïzïl Arslan Atsïz 'Alâ' adDîn | 1127-1156 |
Vassal of Qara Khitaï, 1141 | |
Il Arslan | 1156-1172 |
Tekish Tâj adDunyâ wadDîn | 1172-1200 |
Overthrows last Sejuks in Iraq, 1194 | |
Muh.ammad 'Alâ' adDîn | 1200-1220 |
Conquest of Qarakhânids, 1212, of Ghûrids, 1215 | |
Mengübirti Jalâl adDîn | 1220-1231 |
Thrown out of Transoxanian by Mongols, 1220-1221; Mongol conquest, 1231 |
THE ZANGID ATABEGS OF MOSUL, ALEPPO, & DAMASCUS | |||
---|---|---|---|
Zangî I 'Imâd adDîn | appointed by Seljuk Sult.ân Mah.mûd II, 1127; Atabeg of Mosul, 1127-1146 | ||
Capture of the County of Edessa from Crusaders, 1144 | |||
MOSUL | ALEPPO, & DAMASCUS | ||
Ghâzî I Sayf adDîn | 1146-1149 | Mah.mûd Nûr adDîn | 1147-1174 |
Mawdûd Qut.b adDîn | 1149-1170 | Second Crusade, 1147-1149; captures Damascus, 1154; sends Shîrkûh to conquer Egypt, 1169; Shîrkûh dies, command passes to Saladin, 1169 | |
Ghâzî II Sayf adDîn | 1170-1180 | Ismâ'îl Nûr adDîn | 1174-1181 |
Mas'ûd I 'Izz adDîn | 1180-1193 | SINJÂR | |
Zangî II 'Imâd adDîn | Sinjâr, 1171-1197 | ||
JAZÎRA | Damascus & Aleppo, 1181-1183 | ||
Sanjar Shâh Mu'izz adDîn | 1180-1208 | Conquest of Damacus & Aleppo by Saladin, 1183 | |
Arslan Shâh I Nûr adDîn | Mosul, 1193-1211 | Muh.ammad Qut.b adDîn | 1197-1219 |
Mah.mûd Mu 'izz adDîn | Jazîra, 1208-1241 | ||
Mas'ûd II 'Izz adDîn | Mosul, 1211-1218 | ||
Arslan Shâh II Nûr adDîn | 1218-1219 | ||
Mah.mûd Nâs.ir adDîn | 1219-1234 | Shâhanshâh 'Imad adDîn, Mah.mûd Jalâl adDîn, & 'Umar Fat.h adDîn | 1219-1220 |
Conquest by Ayyûbids, 1220 | |||
Lu'lu' Badr adDîn | Mosul, Lu'lu'id, 1234-1259 | Mas'ûd al-Malik al-Z.âhir | Jazîra, 1241-1250 |
Ismâ'îl Rukn adDîn | Lu'lu'id, 1259-1262 | Conquest by Ayyûbids, 1250, then Lu'lu'ids | |
Mongol dominion, 1254, conquest, 1262 |
This began what might be called the Islâmic Reconquista of the Crusader states in the Middle East. The vigor of Zangî's house seemed to promise the complete defeat of the Crusaders, but Mah.mûd Nûr ad-Dîn chose his own lieutenants far too well for the preservation of Zangid authority. His Kurdish general Shîrkûh completed the conquest of Egypt; but Shîrkûh then died, leaving authority to his nephew Yûsuf ibn 'Ayyûb, who became S.alâh.ud-Dîn. Nûr ad-Dîn soon discovered that S.alâh.ud-Dîn had his own ideas about governing Egypt, like ignoring orders to depose the last Fatimid Caliph (who then died a natural death in 1171). The insubordination of the subordinate soon was a practical independence that Nûr ad-Dîn could not contest before his death (1174). The tables were soon turned, as S.alâh.ud-Dîn returned to take Damascus from the Zangids (1183) and then Jerusalem from the Crusaders (1187). The Islâmic Reconquista thus had passed to the Ayyûbids, as would eventually most of the rest of the Zangid possessions. What the Ayyûbids didn't get, the Mongol Il Khâns did.
THE AYYÛBID SULT.ÂNS | |||
---|---|---|---|
EGYPT | DAMASCUS | ||
1169-1193 | anNâs.ir I S.alâh.udDîn (Saladin) Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb | 1183-1186 | |
Battle of the Horns of Hattin, Capture of King Guy of Jerusalem; Fall of Jerusalem, 1187; Third Crusade, led by King Richard I, 1189-1192 | |||
al-'Azîz Imad adDîn | 1193-1198 | al-'Afd.al Nûr adDîn | 1186-1196 |
al-Mansûr Nâs.ir adDîn | 1198-1200 | al-'Adil I Sayf adDîn | 1196-1201 |
1200-1218 | |||
Fourth Crusade, 1202-1204 | |||
1218-1238 | al-Kamil I Nâs.ir adDîn | al-Mu'az.z.am Sharaf adDîn | Governor 1201-1218 |
1218-1227 | |||
al-Nâs.ir II S.alâh. adDîn | 1227-1229 | ||
al-Ashraf I Muz.affar adDîn | 1229-1237 | ||
asS.âlih. I 'Imad adDîn | 1237-1238 1239-1245 | ||
1238 | |||
Fifth Crusade, 1228-1229; Jerusalem turned over to Emperor Frederick II; remained in Crusader Hands, 1229-1244 | |||
1238-1240 | al-'Adil II Sayf adDîn | 1238-1239 | |
1240-1249 | asS.âlih. II Najm adDîn | 1239, 1245-1249 | |
1249-1250 | al-Mu'az.z.am Tûrân-Shâh Ghiyât adDîn | 1249-1250 | |
Sixth Crusade, 1248-1254; St. Louis IX captured and held for ranson, 1250-1254 | |||
Shajar adDurr, widow of Najm adDîn | 1250 | anNâs.ir II S.alâh. adDîn | 1250-1260 |
al-Ashraf II Muz.affar adDîn | 1250-1252, nominally until 1254 | ||
Sult.ânate of Egypt seized by the Mamlûk Slave-soldier Aybak, 1252 | |||
Damascus occupied by Mongols, then seized by the Mamlûk Baybars, 1260 |
Although originally ruling from Egypt, Saladin spent the last years of his life fighting in Syria and Palestine and was buried in Damascus, next to the Omayyad Mosque. The Ayyubid family still survives in Lebanon and retains Saladin's sword. His tomb is intact and open to visitors of the Omayyad Mosque. It was even visited by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.
Under Saladin, Cairo replaces Baghdad as the intellectual center of the Central Islâmic lands. The great Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and the Sûfî 'Ibn 'Arabî (1165-1240) both relocated from Spain to Egypt. This climate became the subject of the play Nathan der Weise (1779) by Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781). Saladin's toleration, however, had its limits, since he executed another Sûfî, Suhrawardî (1153-1191) for heterodoxy -- less of a danger for Islâmic mystics than for Christian, but still a problem.
The genealogy of the Ayyûbids that follows is from The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.70-73] and A History of the Crusades, Volume III, The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades by Steven Runciman [Cambridge University Press, 1951, 1993, p.532]. Since Bosworth simply gives names, and the genealogy there must be reconstructed from the patronymics, about which there are minor but confusing variations, some uncertainties occur. Some of these can be confirmed or corrected with Runciman's chart, which otherwise is innocent of dates and of diacritics for Arabic. The chart below includes the Ayyubid lines for Aleppo and H.ims. (Homs) that are not included in the table above. A larger popup table also includes the lines of H.amâh, Yaman (Yemen), and Diyâr Bakr. The continuation of the Ayyubids in Diyâr Bakr under the Mongols, until annexation by the White Sheep Turks, is covered in a separate popup. Dïyarbakir is today a city in Turkey, on the upper Tigris near where the Tigris and Euphrates approach each other before diverging courses. South of this, the broad area between the rivers came to be called the Nahrain, the "Two Rivers," or the Jazîra, the "Island." Today, the northern part lies in Turkey and the southern part in Syria. A corner of it lies in Iraq northwest of Mosul. Edessa, long the principal city of the area and a Crusader County, is now the city of Urfa in Turkey. It is not clear from the sources who actually used the title Sult.ân. I have restricted it to the rulers in Egypt and Damascus. Other rulers are simply "Lords," except Yemen, whose ruler Rucimen calls "King." As a matter of fact, every single one of these sovereigns employs the title al-Malik, i.e. "the King" -- so I have at least used it for Yemen.
THE MULÛK AT-TAWÂ'IF, REYES DE TAIFAS | |
---|---|
Cordova, Qurt.ubah | |
H.amdîn al-Mans.ûr | 1144-1145, 1146 |
Ah.mad III Sayf ad-Dawla Hûdid | 1145-1146 |
Yah.yâ ibn Ghâniya | 1146-1148 |
Almohad conquest, 1148 | |
Valencia, Balansiyyah | |
Mans.ûr ibn 'Abdallâh Qâd.î | 1144-1147 |
Abû 'Abdallâh Muh.ammad (Rey Lobo/Lope) | 1147-1172 |
Hilâl | 1172 |
Almohad conquest, 1172 |
Murcia, Mursiyah | |
---|---|
'Abdallâh ibn 'Iyâd. | 1145-1148 |
'Abdallâh ibn Faraj ath-Thaghrî | 1145-1148 |
Abû 'Abdallâh Muh.ammad of Valencia | 1148-1172 |
Almohad conquest, 1172 | |
The Banû Ghâniya of Majorca | |
Muh.ammad al-Mussûfî ibn Ghâniya | 1126-1155 |
'Abdallâh | 1155 |
Abû Ibrâhîm Ish.âq | 1155-1183 |
Muh.ammad ibn Ish.âq | 1183-1184 |
'Alî ibn Ish.âq | 1184-1187 |
'Abdallâh ibn Ish.âq | 1187-1203 |
Almohad conquest, 1203 |
MUWAH.ID (ALMOHAD) CALIPHS OF SPAIN & NORTH AFRICA | |
---|---|
'Abdul-Mu'min | 1130-1163 |
Yûsuf I abû Yaqûb | 1163-1184 |
Ya'qûb ibn Yûsuf al-Mans.ûr | 1184-1199 |
Muh.ammad ibn Ya'qûb | 1199-1213 |
devastating defeat by Christian Spain at Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212 | |
Yûsuf II Abû Yaqûb | 1213-1224 |
'Abdul-Wâh.id Abû Muh.ammad | 1224 |
'Abdallâh Abû Muh.ammad | 1224-1227 |
Yah.yâ Abû Zakariyyâ' | 1227-1235 |
Idrîs I ibn Ya'qûb | 1227-1232 |
abandonment of Spain, 1228-1229 | |
'Abdul-Wâh.id ibn Idrîs I | 1232-1242 |
'Alî ibn Idrîs I | 1242-1248 |
'Umar ibn Ish.âq | 1248-1266 |
Idrîs II ibn Muh.ammad | 1266-1269 |
North Africa breaks up between H.afs.ids, Marînids, & 'Abdul-Wâdids (Zayyânids) |
The Almohads styled themselves Caliphs, something not always noted in historical summaries of the area. Since they were Orthodox and the Abbasid line in Baghbad had not ended yet (though it would by the end of the dynasty), the precedent must have been the Omayyad Caliphate in Spain -- if there was even a concern with precedent.
The Marînid Amîrs of Morocco | |
---|---|
'Abd al-H.aqq I | 1195-1217 |
'Uthmân I | 1217-1240 |
Muh.ammad I | 1240-1244 |
Abû Bakr | 1244-1258 |
'Umar | 1258-1259 |
Ya'qûb | 1259-1286 |
Yûsuf | 1286-1307 |
'Âmir | 1307-1308 |
Sulaymân | 1308-1310 |
'Uthmân II | 1310-1331 |
'Alî | 1331-1351 |
Fâris | 1351-1358 |
Muh.ammad II | 1358-1359 |
Ibrâhîm | 1359-1361 |
Tâshufîn | 1361 |
'Abd al-H.alîm | 1361-1362 |
Muh.ammad III | 1362-1366 |
'Abd al-'Azîz I | 1366-1372 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1372-1374 |
Ah.mad | 1374-1384, 1387-1393 |
Mûsâ | 1384-1386 |
Muh.ammad V | 1386 |
Muh.ammad VI | 1386-1387 |
'Abd al-'Azîz II | 1393-1396 |
'Abd Allâh | 1396-1398 |
'Uthmân III | 1398-1420 |
'Abd al-H.aqq II | 1420-1465 |
The Wat.t.âsid Amîrs of Morocco | |
Yah.yâ I al-Wat.t.âsî | regent, 1428-1448 |
'Alî | regent, 1448-1458 |
Yah.yâ II | regent, 1458-1459 |
interregnum, Idrîsid Shurafâ, 1465-1471 | |
Muh.ammad I | 1472-1504 |
Muh.ammad II | 1504-1526 |
'Alî | 1526, 1554 |
Ah.mad | 1526-1545, 1547-1549 |
Muh.ammad III | 1545-1547 |
The Sa'did Sharîfs of Morocco | |
Muh.ammad I al-Qâ'im al-Mahdî | 1510-1517 |
Ah.mad al-A'raj | 1517-1543 |
Mah.ammad ash-Shaykh | 1517-1557 |
'Abdallâh | 1557-1574 |
Muh.ammad II | 1574-1576 |
'Abd al-Malik | 1576-1578 |
Ah.mad | 1578-1603 |
Zaydân | Fez, 1603-1604; Marrakech, 1609-1627 |
'Abdallâh | Marrakech, 1603-1606; Fez, 1606-1609 |
Mah.ammad | Fex, 1606-1613 |
'Abdallâh | Marrakech, 1606-1609; Fex, 1609-1623 |
'Abd al-Malik ash-Shaykh | Fez, 1623-1627 |
'Abd al-Malik an-Nâs.ir | Marrakech, 1627-1631 |
Muh.ammad al-Walîd | Marrakech, 1631-1636 |
Mah.ammad ash-Shaykh | 1636-1655 |
Ah.mad ash-Shaykh | 1655-1659 |
The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, & Kings of Morocco, 1640-present |
The H.afs.id Amirs, Caliphs, or Sult.âns of Tunisia | |
---|---|
Yah.yâ I | 1229-1249 |
Muh.ammad I | 1249-1277 |
Seventh Crusade by St. Louis IX, 1270 | |
Yah.yâ II | 1277-1279 |
Ibrâhîm I | 1279-1283 |
'Abd al-'Azîz | 1283 |
Ah.mad | 1283-1284 |
'Umar I | 1284-1295 |
Muh.ammad II | 1295-1309 |
Abû Bakr I | 1309 |
Khâlid I | 1309-1311, d.1313 |
Zakariyâ' I | 1311-1317 |
Muh.ammad III | 1317-1318 |
Abû Bakr II | 1318-1346 |
Ah.mad I | 1346-1347 |
'Umar II | 1347 |
Marînid rule, 1347-1350 | |
al-Fad.l | 1350 |
Ibrâhîm II | 1350-1369 |
Khâlid II | 1369-1370 |
Ah.mad II | 1370-1394 |
'Abd al-'Azîz | 1394-1434 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1434-1435 |
'Uthmân | 1435-1488 |
Yah.yâ III | 1488-1489 |
'Abd al-Mu'min | 1489-1490 |
Zkariyâ' II | 1490-1494 |
Muh.ammad V | 1494-1526 |
Muh.ammad VI | 1526-1534, 1535-1542 |
Ottoman occupation, 1534-1535; vassal of Charles V, 1635-1569 | |
Ah.mad III | 1542-1569 |
Ottoman rule, 1569-1573 | |
Muh.ammad VII | 1573-1574 |
vassal of Spain, 1573-1574; Ottoman conquest & direct rule, 1574-1705 |
The Zayyânid or Ziyânid Amîrs of Algeria | |
---|---|
Yaghmurâsan ibn Ziyân or Zayyân | 1236-1283 |
'Uthmân I | 1283-1304 |
Muh.ammad I | 1304-1308 |
Mûsâ I | 1308-1318 |
'Abd ar-Rah.mân I | 1318-1337 |
Marînid rule, 1337-1348 | |
'Uthmân II & al-Zaîm | 1348-1352 |
Marînid rule, 1352-1359 | |
Mûsâ II | 1359-1389 |
'Abd ar-Rah.mân II | 1389-1394 |
Yûsuf I | 1394 |
Yûsuf I | 1394-1395 |
Muh.ammad II | 1395-1400 |
'Abdallâh I | 1400-1402 |
Muh.ammad III | 1402-1411 |
'Abd ar-Rah.mân III | 1411 |
Sa'îd | 1411 |
'Abd al-Wâh.id | 1411-1424, 1428-1430 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1424-1428 |
Ah.mad I | 1430-1462 |
Muh.ammad V | 1462-1469 |
Abû Tâshufîn | 1469 |
Muh.ammad VI | 1469-1504 |
Muh.ammad VII | 1504-1517 |
vassal of Spain, 1512 | |
Mûsâ III | 1517-1528 |
Ottoman presence, 1518 | |
'Abdallâh | 1528-1540 |
Muh.ammad VIII | 1540-1541 |
Ah.mad II | 1541-1543, 1544-1550 |
Spanish occupation, 1543-1544 | |
al-H.asan | 1550-1555 |
Ottoman conquest, 1555; Barbary States | |
French occupation, 1830-1871; French annexation; 1871-1962; Republic of Algeria, 1962-present |
These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002]. Bosworth has all of the rulers listed, while Morby gives only the Marînids [p.183] and H.afs.ids [p.185]. Morby has a clearer presentation, but Bosworth also has a brief discussion of the history.
With the Crusades, Francia begins to develop the seapower that enables it to return to North Africa. On the Seventh Crusade in 1270, St. Louis IX of France lands in Tunisia, formally as a preparation to return to Egypt but apparently simply at the self-interested urging of his brother, Charles of Anjou, who wanted to enlarge his Mediterranean empire. He dies instead and accomplishes nothing for Charles -- it is also the last Crusade.
After completing the expulsion of Islâm from Spain, both Spain and Portugal become intent on expanding into North Africa. Various cities get taken and held for a time, and local rulers become temporary vassals, but nothing permanent gets accomplished and it seems impossible to establish a durable or extensive presence on the continent.
It is not Europe but Turkey that actually does this. Both the H.afs.ids and Ziyânds come to an end with the Turkish conquest. Indeed, in the last stages, the local rulers sometimes relied on the Christians as allies against the Turks. North Africa thus became a theater of the larger conflict between Christendom and the Ottomans.
North Africa, however, was a long way from Constantinople. And as the Turkish reach slackened with time, local governors and princes began to run their own operations. This came to mean piracy and slaving. We enter the period of the Barbary States, a good three hundred years, when corsairs, from Algeria especially, were a plague on the surrounding seas, with ship after ship taken, and Christian crews and passengers sold on the slave markets. After 1604, when English pirates taught them Atlantic navigation, Barbary ships ranged as far as Newfoundland and even captured ships in Plymouth harbor. Between 1609 and 1616, they captured 446 English ships and sold more than 7000 English captives as slaves. Some such captives might be ransomed, but many others were lost the rest of their lives. Christian states were scandalized by this, but punitive expeditions were usually no more successful than they had been since St. Louis. An English expedition against Algeria in 1620 was a failure, but one in 1637 was more successful, seizing the city of Salee, with 300 captives freed. Nevertheless, it was easier to pay for "protection" and buy off the pirates (who also sometimes could be used as allies against other European powers). This was never more than partially effective, since, as the saying goes, once you pay the Danegeld, you can't get rid of the Dane (very similar kinds of pirates and slavers, as pagans, in their day).
The situation became especially infuriating to the new but distant United States of America. After paying $2,000,000 in extortion money, Thomas Jefferson had had enough and in 1801 sent the U.S. Navy and Marines against the city of Tripoli (actually just east of Tunisia, in modern Libya). This brought at least a temporary respite, and contributed a phrase ("the shores of Tripoli") to the Marine Hymn. The piracy and slaving did not really and fully end, however, until the French landed in Algeria, intent upon conquest, in 1830. They had a hard fight against the local charismatic leader, Abd al-Kader, from 1832 to 1847, but they accomplished the task. Fighting there would often be in French Algeria, for which the legendary Foreign Legion would be created, but local pirates would no longer plague the seas or harvest Christian merchants and travellers for slaves.
Islâmic Index
The Keita Kings of Mali | |
---|---|
Mari Sun Dayâta (Mârî Jât.â) I | 1230-1255 |
Mansâ Ulî/Ule | 1255-1270 |
Mansâ Wâtî | 1270-1274 |
Mansâ Khalîfa | 1274-1275 |
Mansâ Abû Bakr I, Bata-Mande-Bori | 1275-1285 |
Sabakura/Sâkûra | freedman, 1285-1300 |
Mansâ Gaw/Qû | 1300-1305 |
Mansâ Mamadu/Muh.ammad | 1305-1310, d.1312 |
Mansâ Abû Bakr II | 1310-1312 |
Mansâ Mûsâ I | 1312-1337 |
Mansâ Maghan/Maghâ I | 1337-1341 |
Mansâ Sulaymân | 1341-1360 |
Mansâ Kamba/Qanba/Qâsâ | 1360-1361 |
Mansâ Mari Dyâta/Mârî Jât.a II | 1361-1374 |
Mansâ Mûsâ II | 1374-1382 |
Mansâ Maghan II | 1382-1388/89 |
Sandigi/S.andiki | usurper, 1288/89-1390 |
Mansâ Maghan III, Mah.mûd | 1390 |
succession strife, ascendancy of Songhay |
Today this area suffers from an advance of the desert that has continued through all historical time. The Sahara has only gotten worse in the last five thousand years and more. The mediaeval kingdom thus enjoyed considerable rainfall and arable land now lost. The modern Republic of Mali, although encompassing some of the same territory as the old Kingdom, nevertheless has no direct connection to it and is named just in commemoration of it.
The fury and anaesthesia of Islamic Fascism have now come to historic and fabled Timbuktu. In late June, 2012, Islamist fanatics, such as the "Ansar Dine" group, have by pick-axes, hoes, and fire destroyed the tombs of the Mediaeval Muslim Saints Sidi Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and Alpha Moya in Timbuktu, previously called the "city of 333 Saints." This is consistent with the vandalism visited on cultural and religious artifacts by Jihadists, as most notoriously seen in the destruction of Buddhist art and monuments in Afghanistan; but it may surprise some that Islamic monuments, in this case ones designated by UNESCO as "world-heritage" sites, are now the target. But the Wahhabist inspired Islam of modern zealots regards the veneration or even commemoration of saints as un-Islamic, and they scruple at no death or destruction to enforce their particular fundamentalism. Since their fire also burned priceless manuscripts in the tombs, they are also indifferent to traditions of Islamic literature and historiography. In short, they are savages and barbarians, in the fullest senses of those terms. It is extraordinary that the modern world still has to deal with people like this.
The Si & Askiya Kings of Songhay | |
---|---|
Sonni 'Alî Ber, the Great | 1464/1465-1492 |
Abû Bakr/Bakari/Baru | 1492-1493 |
Muh.ammad I Ture Askiya/Sikiya | 1493-1528, d.1538 |
Mûsâ | 1528-1531 |
Muh.ammad II Benkan | 1531-1537 |
Ismâ'îl | 1537-1539 |
Ish.âq I | 1539-1549 |
Dâwûd | 1549-1582 |
Muh.ammad III | 1582-1586 |
Muh.ammad IV Bani | 1586-1588 |
Ish.âq II | 1588-1591 |
Muh.ammad V Gao/Kawkaw | 1591-1592 |
conquest by Morocco, 1591-1592 |
The successor to Mali on the Niger River, Songhay had begun a good bit earlier, back in the 9th century. However, there really are no dates before the Si (or Sonni) dynasty, beginning with 'Alî Golom (or Kolon) around 1275. Songhay is then a vassal of Mali. After that, things are still obscure, with few dates and even poorly attested names for the rulers until Sonni 'Alî "the Great," who definitively established the ascendency of Songhay in the area. In short order Muh.ammad I Ture Askiya founds a new dynasty, which continues until the Morocco conquest. The Moroccans had the advantage at this point of firearms, but their ability to hold the area was limited. Even the presence of a Moroccan governor in Timbuktu seems to have lapsed around 1660. The region fell into disorder.
The kings of both Mali and Songhay are from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.122-125].
THE MAMLÛK SULT.ÂNS OF EGYPT, 1252-1517 | |
---|---|
Bah.rî line, 1252-1390 (usually Turkish) | |
Aybak al-Turkumânî | 1250, 1252-1257 |
'Alî I | 1257-1259 |
Qutuz al-Mu'izzî | 1259-1260 |
Baybars I al-Bunduqdârî | 1260-1277 |
Defeats Mongols, 1260 | |
Baraka/Berke Khân | 1277-1279 |
Salâmish/Süleymish | 1279 |
Qalâwûn al-Alfî | 1279-1290 |
Khalîl | 1290-1293 |
Fall of Acre, 1291; End of Outremer | |
Baydarâ(?) | 1293 |
Muh.ammad I | 1293-1294, 1299-1309, 1310-1341 |
Kitbughâ | 1294-1296 |
Lâchîn/Lâjîn al-Ashqar | 1296-1299 |
Pharos Lighthouse collapses after earthquake, 1303 | |
Baybars II al-Jâshnakîr (Burjî) | 1309-1310 |
Abû Bakr | 1341 |
Kûjûk/Küchük | 1341-1342 |
Ah.mad I | 1342 |
Ismâ'îl | 1342-1345 |
Sha'bân I | 1345-1346 |
H.âjjî I | 1346-1347 |
al-H.asan | 1347-1351, 1354-1361 |
S.âlih. | 1351-1354 |
Muh.ammad II | 1361-1363 |
Sha'bân II | 1363-1377 |
'Alî II | 1377-1382 |
H.âjjî II | 1382, 1389-1390 |
Burjî line, 1382-1517 (usually Circassian) | |
Barqûq al-Yalburghâwî | 1382-1398, 1390-1399 |
Faraj | 1399-1405, 1405-1412 |
'Abd al-'Aziz | 1405 |
al-Musta'în | 1412 |
1406-1414, Caliph | |
Shaykh al-Mah.mûdî al-Z.âhirî | 1412-1421 |
Ah.mad II | 1421 |
T.ât.âr | 1421 |
Muh.ammad III | 1421-1422 |
Barsbay | 1422-1438 |
Yûsuf | 1438 |
Chaqmaq/Jaqmaq | 1438-1453 |
'Uthmân | 1453 |
Inâl al-'Alâ'î al-Z.âhirî | 1453-1461 |
Ah.mad III | 1461 |
Khushqadam | 1461-1467 |
Yalbay | 1467 |
Timurbughâ | 1467-1468 |
Qâyit Bay al-Z.âhirî | 1468-1496 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1496-1498 |
Qâns.awh I | 1498-1500 |
Jânbulât. | 1500-1501 |
T.ûmân Bay I | 1501 |
Qâns.awh II al-Ghawrî | 1501-1516 |
T.ûmân Bay II | 1516-1517 |
Ottoman Conquest by Selîm I Yavuz; line of Mamlûks actually continues until 1811 |
THE ABBASID PUPPET CALIPHS OF EGYPT, 1261-1517 AD, UNDER THE MAMLÛKS | |
---|---|
Ah.mad al-Mustans.ir | 1261 |
Ah.mad al-H.âkim I | 1261-1262 in Aleppo |
1262-1302 in Cairo | |
Sulaymân al-Mustakfî I | 1302-1340 |
Ibrâhîm al-Wâthiq I | 1340-1341 |
Ah.mad al-H.akîm II | 1341-1352 |
Abû Bakr al-Mu'tad.id I | 1352-1362 |
Muh.ammad al-Mutawakkil I | 1362-1377, 1377-1383, 1389-1406 |
Zakariyyâ' al-Mu'tas.im | 1377, 1386-1389 |
'Umar al-Wâthiq II | 1383-1386 |
'Abbâs or Ya'qûb al-Musta'în | 1406-1414 |
Sult.ân, 1412 | |
Dâwûd al-Mu'tad.id II | 1414-1441 |
Sulaymân al-Mustakfî II | 1441-1451 |
H.amza al-Qâ'im | 1451-1455 |
Yûsuf al-Mustanjid | 1455-1479 |
'Abdul'Azîz al-Mutawakkil II | 1479-1497 |
Ya'qûb al-Mustamsik | 1497-1508, 1516-1517 |
al-Mutawakkil III | 1508-1516, 1517 |
1517, Caliph removed to I.stanbul by Ottoman Sult.ân Selîm I Yavuz, later credited with assuming Caliphate |
This collection, including stories that must have been circulating for many centuries, is noteworthy for the social, cultural, and religious attitudes it reveals. While fiercely pro-Islâmic, with stories even about questions of Islâmic Law, and a very long and boring one about fighting the Romans (with nice touches like the notion that Christian incense is made from the excrement of Bishops), we find things that now seem rather un-Islâmic. For instance, there is a great deal of wine drinking, which seems to be casually accepted, even while its irreligion, strictly speaking, is noted. Thus, in one story, a character swears off wine in order to purify himself for the Pilgrimage. In another story, a man discovers that his wife has been having sex with a gorilla. With a shocking touch of racism, this affair is said to have commenced after a previous black lover had died (which fits the surviving stereotype of black sexual prowess but betrays ignorance of the anatomy of gorillas, which actually have smaller genitals than humans). We might expect that the proper thing to do about this would be to kill the wife. However, the wife's unnatural lust is extraordinarily treated as a medical disorder, and a physician is employed to cure her, which he does. Besides the wine drinking, there seems to be considerable ease and interest in unsanctioned sexual activities. Even those eunuchs who have been deprived of their testicles but not their penises boast of their ability to have sex with their mistresses. One real world consequence of that was the custom of only using black eunuchs, who typically had amputated penises, in the harîm.
Although the story of the Mamlûks is easily thought to end in 1517 with the Ottoman conquest, the amazing truth is that the Mamlûk garrison was not abolished by the Turks and that, as Ottoman authority weakened, Egypt ended up again under the de facto rule of the same "peculiar institution." Thus, when Napoleon arrived in Egypt in 1798, it was the Mamlûks with whom he had to contend. When he defeated them at the Battle of the Pyramids, he may not have stopped to think (so distracted by all the Egyptian stuff) that he had beaten victors over the Mongols. Nevertheless, this was still not the end of the Mamlûk story. They retreated up the Nile from the French and were again contesting the rule of Egypt when Muh.ammad 'Alî deceived, trapped, and exterminated them in 1811.
What did end in 1517 was the line of Abbasid Caliphs. The last was taken off to Constantinople. Ironically, this was al-Mutawakkil III -- the same title as the Caliph who was assassinated by his own Turkish guard in 861. It is not clear whether the Ottomans had any intention of continuing the line, as useful figureheads, as the Mamlûks had, for the Caliph and any possible descendants simply disappear from history. Later, when the Sult.âns got to thinking about it, they claimed the Caliphate for themselves.
The Hûdids of Murcia | |
---|---|
Muh.ammad ibn Hûd al-Mutawakkil | 1228-1238 |
Conquest of Valencia by Aragón, 1238 | |
Muh.ammad al-Wâthiq | 1238-1239, 1264-? |
al-'Azîz D.iyâ'ad-Dawla | 1239-1241 |
Muh.ammad Abû Ja'far Bahâ'ad-Dawla | 1241-1262 |
Muh.ammad ibn Abî J'afar Muh.ammad | 1262-1264 |
occupation by Granada, ?-1266 | |
Conquest by Aragón, 1266 |
THE NAS.RID SULT.ÂNS OF GRANADA | |
---|---|
Muh.ammad I al-Ghâlib, ibn al-Ah.mar | 1232-1273 |
Muh.ammad II al-Faqîh | 1273-1302 |
Muh.ammad III al-Makhlû' | 1302-1309 |
Nas.r | 1309-1314 |
Ismâ'îl I | 1314-1325 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1325-1333 |
Yûsuf I al-Mu'ayyad | 1333-1354 |
Muh.ammad V al-Ghani | 1354-1359, 1362-1391 |
Ismâ'îl II | 1359-1360 |
Muh.ammad VI al-Ghâlib, el Bermejo | 1360-1362 |
Yûsuf II al-Mustahgnî | 1391-1392 |
Muh.ammad VII al-Mustâ'în | 1392-1408 |
Yûsuf III an-Nâs.ir | 1408-1417 |
Muh.ammad VIII al-Mustamassik, al-S.aghîr, el Pequeño | 1417-1419, 1427-1429 |
Muh.ammad IX al-Ghâlib, al-Aysar, el Zurdo | 1419-1427, 1429-1432, 1432-1445, 1447-1453 |
Yûsuf IV, Abenalmao | 1432 |
Muh.ammad X al-Ah.naf, el Cojo | 1445, 1446-1447 |
Yûsuf V, Aben Ismael | 1445-1446, 1462 |
Muh.ammad XI, el Chiquito | 1451-1455 |
Sa'd al-Musta'în, Ciriza, Muley Zad | 1454-1464 |
'Alî, Muley Hácen | 1464-1482, 1483-1485 |
Muh.ammad XII al-Zughûbî, Boabdil el Chico | 1482-1483, 1486-1492, d. 1533 |
Mu.hammad ibn Sa'd al-Zaghal | 1485-1490 |
Conquest by Castile & Aragón, end of Islamic Spain, 1492 |
THE SULT.ÂNS OF MALACCA/MELAKA | |
---|---|
Parameshvara | 1403-1414 |
Chinese suzerainty, 1409 | |
Megat Iskandar Shâh | 1414-1424 |
Shri Maharâjâ Sult.ân Muhammad Shâh | 1424-1445 |
last Chinese fleet visit, 1433 | |
Râjâ Ibrâhîm Shri Paramesvara Deva Shâh | 1445-1446 |
Râjâ Qâsim Sult.ân Maz.affar Shâh | 1446-1459 |
Râjâ 'Abdallâh Sult.ân Mans.ûr Shâh | 1459-1477 |
Sult.ân 'Alâ' ad-Dîn Ri'âyat | 1477-1488 |
Sult.ân Mah.mud Shâh | 1488-1510, 1510-1528 |
Sult.ân Ah.mad Shâh | 1510 |
Portuguese conquest, 1511; dynasty continues in Johor, 1528; Dutch, 1641; British, 1824 |
At the beginning of the line of the Sult.âns of Malacca, it was Siam that exerted influence. But then in 1409 the Chinese arrived. Admiral Zheng He and his great fleets, projecting the new power of the Ming Dynasty, established a base at Malacca, and the Sult.ân became a tributary of China. He even sailed to China to pay homage to the Emperor. A Chinese cantonment protected, stored, and shipped goods from China and those obtained on the further expeditions into the Indian Ocean. On nearby Sumatra, a Chinese governor was installed at Palembang after a Chinese pirate was defeated, captured, and sent back to China for execution. In northern Sumatra (near Acheh), troops were put ashore to install one king and execute his rival. A king in Ceylon was defeated and sent to China, but then the Emperor returned him to his kingdom (thought he evidently was unable to recover his throne). Some of Zheng He's detachments went into the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and even down the coast of Africa, perhaps as far as Zanzibar. This impressive exercise ended abruptly in 1433, when the xenophobic Confucian faction became dominant at the Chinese Court. China was cut off from the external world and began to lose its ability to deal with that world, either culturally, economically, or militarily.
Arriving next by sea and by trade would be the Portuguese (led by Afonso de Albuquerque), Dutch, and British, all of whom were also interested in secure bases for their activities. So Malacca became a European colony. Under the British, it became part of the Straits Settlements, which was a string of cities along, indeed, the Straits of Malacca, between Malaya and Sumatra. British Malaya was otherwise a group of client kingdoms, including some whose rulers were actually descendants of the Sult.âns of Malacca.
In 1972 I was looking through some books that were on sale at the University of Hawai'i bookstore. Among them I found two small pamphlets that looked like children's primers written entirely in the Arabic alphabet. I had no idea what these could be, or what they were doing in Hawai'i. They were, however, published in Singapore by the "Malaysia Press Ltd." This was the clue; for, as I soon learned, and as is generally characteristic in Mediaeval Islamic converts, the Arabic alphabet is adopted to write the local language, which was Malay. This grew up as a trade language of Malaya and Indonesia,
THE SULT.ÂNS OF ACHEH/ATJEH/ACEH | |
---|---|
'Inâyat Shâh | c.1450-? |
Muz.affar Shâh | d.1497 |
Shams ad-Dîn Shâh | ?-c.1496 |
'Alî Mughâyat Shâh | c.1496-c.1530 |
S.alâh. ad-Dîn | c.1530-c.1537 |
Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn al-Qahhâr | c.1537-1571 |
appeals to Ottoman Sult.ân for aid against the Portuguese, 1563 | |
'Alî/H.usayn Ri'âyat Shâh | 1571-1579 |
Sultan Muda | 1579 |
Sultan Shri 'Âlam | 1579 |
Zayn al-'Âbidîn | 1579 |
Mans.ûr Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1579-c.1586 |
'Alî Ri'âyat Shâh Râjâ Buyung | c.1586-c.1588 |
Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | c.1588-1604 |
'Alî Ri'âyat Shah/Sultan Muda | 1604-1607 |
Iskandar Muda Makota 'Âlam | 1607-1636 |
Mughâyat Shâh, Iskandar Thânî 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1636-1641 |
S.afiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh Tâj al-'Âlam | 1641-1675 |
Naqiyyat ad-Dîn Shâ'h Nûr al-'Âlam | 1675-1678 |
Zakiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh 'Inâyat | 1678-1688 |
Zînat ad-Dîn Kamâlat Shâh | 1688-1699 |
Sharîf Hâ'shim Jamâl ad-Dîn Badr al-'Âlam | 1699-1702 |
Perkasa 'Âlam Sharîf Lamtuy | 1702-1703 |
Badr al-Munîr, Jamâl al-'Âlam | 1703-1726 |
Amîn ad-Dîn Shâh, Jawhar al-'Âlam | 1726 |
Shams al-'Âlam, Wandi Tebing | 1726-1727 |
Ah.mad Shâh, Maharâjâ Lela Melayu, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1727-1735 |
Jahân Shâh, Potjut Auk, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1735-1760 |
Mah.mûd Shâh, Tuanku Raja | 1760-1781 |
Muh.ammad Shâh, Taunku Muh.ammad, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1781-1795 |
Jawhar al-'Âlam Shâh, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1795-1824 |
Muh.ammad Shâh | 1824-1836 |
Mans.ûr Shâh | 1836-1870 |
Mah.mûd Shâh | 1870-1874 |
capital at Kutaraja captured by Dutch, 1874 | |
Muhammad Dawud Shah, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn | 1874-1903 |
Dutch conquest of Acheh, 1903 |
The way things are going in Islâm, it may well be that the use of the Arabic alphabet will increase; but little of it had been left in public life.
Acheh at the northern end of Sumatra, just across the Straits from Malacca, was a larger and more durable realm. We see less in the way of Sanskrit names and titles, though there are some local names and references, as with Ah.mad Shâh (1727-1735), who is called Maharâjâ Lela Melayu -- i.e. "the Malay." We also see something very unusual in Islam, a number of female rulers.
In 1563 Sult.ân Ri'âyat Shâh of Acheh wrote to the Ottoman Sult.ân, in this case no less than Suleiman the Magnificent, requesting help against the Portuguese. This episode reveals the extent of the Oecumene of Islâm, and the recognition of the common enemy. Turkey at the height of its power, and willing to help, nevertheless had some difficulty projecting that power as far as Indonesia. After a delay of some years, and not until after the death of Suleiman, an Ottoman fleet of 19 ships sailed from Egypt. Only two ships reached Acheh, however, the rest having been diverted to bolster Ottoman authority in Yemen. The aid finally delivered to Acheh was thus minimal and, as it happened, ineffective.
While it is tempting now to think of Indonesia as a unified realm, not only were there multiple sovereignties in earlier days, but their subjugation by the Dutch was a process that took some time. Thus, the last Sult.ân of Acheh held out for many years, and the Dutch conquest was not complete until 1903. We see much the same process in Bali, where Dutch conquest was not complete until 1906, amid scenes of great slaughter, something like 3600 Balinese falling.
Acheh entered the news late in 2004 with a great earthquake, magnitude 9.0, the largest on Earth in forty years, off the coast of Sumatra. This was bad enough, but the tsunami, , generated by the earthquake inundated coasts as far away as Sri Lanka and Thailand. The death toll overall is estimated up to 200,000 people.
We are thus unpleasantly reminded of the geological forces at work under Indonesia, where many great earthquakes and some of the largest volcanic eruptions in the geological record have occurred. For instance, the eruption of Mt. Tambora in 1815 put so much material into the atmosphere that it darkened the sky world wide and produced "the year without summer" in 1816. Not as large but better known was the eruption of Karakatoa (Krakatau, between Java and Sumatra) in 1883. This blew away the small island of Karakatoa itself, with a blast that was actually heard as far as 1000 miles away. There have been few such eruptions anywhere in historical times. Ice cores show a spike of volcanic gasses for 535 AD. It is not known if this was one of the Indonesian volcanoes, but they are the best candidates. It may even have been Karakatoa. It would have been an eruption as large or larger than Tambora. It did have some serious historical consequences. There is much comment in European records of the time about the dim sunlight of 536 AD and the failure of crops thereafter. The cooling may have precipitated the plague that arrived in Egypt in 541. The "Dark Ages Cooling" was thus another heavy blow against the diminishing Roman Empire.
Prehistorically, Sumatra may have been the place of the largest volcanic eruption in the history of the human species. When Mt. Toba erupted 74,000 years ago, it was perhaps 10,000 times the size of the Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980. This could have caused a 5o Celsius (9o Fahrenheit) global drop in temperature around the world. The "year without summer" might have become months or years without summer. There is some evidence that this caused a "genetic bottleneck" in human evolution, which means a large portion of human beings may have died. This was before the advent of fully modern humans, about 30,000 years ago; so, literally, people like us have not seen its like.
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Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
YEMEN, 1230 BC-1962 AD
The State of at-Tababi'a | |
---|---|
al-Harith ar-Raish | 1230-1105 BC |
Abrahah Dhul Manar | 1105-922 |
Afrikis ibn Abrahah | 922-758 |
al-'Abd Dhu al-Adh'ar | 758-733 |
al-Hedhed ibn Sharahil | 733-658 |
Balkis (Bilqis) bint al-Hedhed "Queen of Sheba"? | 658-638 |
Nashir an-Ni'am | 638-553 |
Shammar Yar'ish | 553-516 |
Abu Malik | 516-461 |
Tubba' ibn al-Akran | 461-408 |
Dhu Jaychan | 408-338 |
al-Akran ibn Abu Malik | 338-175 |
Kalikarib | 175-140 |
Ass'ad Abu Karib | 140-20 |
Hassan ibn Tubba' | 20 BC-50 AD |
'Amr ibn Tubba' | 50-113 |
'Abid Kilel | 113-187 |
Tubba' ibn Hassan | 187-265 |
Marthid ibn 'Abid | 265-306 |
Wali'a ibn Marthid | 306-343 |
Abrahah ibn as-Sabbah | 343-416 |
Sahban ibn Muhrath | 416-431 |
Hassan ibn 'Amr ibn Tubba' | 431-488 |
Dhu Shanatir | 488-515 |
Yusuf Ash'ar Dhu-Nuwas | King of Himyar, 515-525 |
convert to Judaism; Ethiopian invasion, 525-c.533 | |
Dhu Jadan | 525-533 |
Ethiopian rule, 533-575; to Himyar, 575-577; to Persia, 577-631; to Islam, 629 |
If there were no ruins or no records, this neglect might be expected; but there are both. South Arabia, indeed, has its own derived version of the alphabet, which survives today in its Ethiopian version. As for inscriptions and literature, Joan Copeland Biella says, in her Dictionary of Old South Arabic [Harvard Semitic Museum Studies 25, 1982]:
....thousands of texts in Sabaean, Minnaean, Qatabanian and H.ad.ramitic have been published, ranging in type from brief graffiti to substantial historical annals. [p.vii] |
The ruins are extensive and include unique structures, like the extraordinary Ma'rib Dam (Sadd Ma'rib in Arabic), built from cut stone in the Wadî Sadd (or Wadi Saba'). This was 1,800 feet long and was not alone, except in scale and fame, in the irrigation of the region. Much is left of the structure, including its spillway system. This should have rated as one of the Seven Wonders of the World. Its final and catastrophic break, however, which entered into Islâmic legend, represented the definitive decline of the area and also the uncertainties of Yemeni history, since the event cannot be well dated -- just between the 5th and the 7th centuries AD.
The name of Yemen itself is of interest. The Romans called the area Arabia Felix, "happy" or "fortunate" Arabia, in contrast to Arabia Deserta, "desert" Arabia, and Arabia Petraea, "rocky" Arabia (where the Romans annexed the remarkable city of Petra). As it happens, Yemen in Arabic, Yaman, is from a verb, yamana, that can mean "to be lucky, fortunate." Yaman can also mean "right side or hand" and "south." This can be contrasted with shâm, which can mean "north," "Syria," and "Damascus" but from a root that can also mean "evil omen," "ominous," "calamity," and "misfortune." The actual word for left in Arabic is different, shamâl -- which can also mean north (we don't get the sinister associations with this root). Indeed, if one faces east, the south is on one's right and the north on the left. And Arabic is not the only language in which right (dexter) is lucky and left (sinister) threatening.
The only proper history book in print that I have found for South Arabia is Robert G. Hoyland's Arabia and the Arabs, From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam [Routledge, 2001]. For the historiography of South Arabia, he says:
....we are equipped with some ten thousand inscriptions. Unfortunately, however, these are not dated according to an absolute era until the first century AD and they almost never allude to events outside south Arabia. Scholars have tried to arrange them in chronological order according to the style of their script, but with hardly any firmly dated examples to provide a fixed point this method can offer no more than a rough indication. [p.36]
Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba | |
---|---|
Samahu 'Ali | c.750 BC |
Yada'-il Dharih | |
Yathi'-amar Watar I | |
Yada'-il Bayin I | |
Yathi'-amar Watar II | |
Kariba-il Bayin | |
Dhamar 'Ali Watar | |
Samahu 'Ali Yanif I | |
Yathi'-amar Bayin I | |
Kariba-il Watar I | c.450 BC |
Samahu 'Ali Darih | |
Kariba-il Watar II | |
Il-Sharah I | |
Yada | |
Yakrib | |
Yathi' | |
Karib-il | |
Samah | |
Il-Sharah II | |
Dhamar | |
Yada' | |
Dhamar | |
Karib-il Watar IV | |
Il-Karib Yuhan'im | |
Karib-il Watar V | |
Wahb-il | |
Anmar Yuhan'im | |
Dhamar 'Ali Darih | |
Nash'a-Karib Yuhamin | |
Nasir Yuhan'im | |
Wahb-il Yahuz | |
Karib-il Watar Yuhan'im | |
Yarim Ayman I | c.80-c.60 BC |
'Alhan Nahfanc | 60-? |
Far'um Yanhab | |
Yarim Ayman II | c.35-c.25 |
Sha'irum Awtar | c.25 BC-? |
Yazil Bayin | c.25 BC-? |
Ilasharah Yahdub | c.25 BC-? |
To Himyar |
Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba | |
---|---|
Yada'il Yanif ben Kariba-il | c.755-c.740 |
Samahu 'Ali Darih I ben Yada'il Yanuf | c.740-715 |
Yathi'-amar Bayin I | |
Dhamar 'Ali I | |
Kariba-il Watar I | c.685-c.675 |
tribute paid to Assyria, 685 | |
Samahu'Ali I | |
Yada'il Darih I | |
Samahu 'Ali Yanuf I | |
Darih | |
Yathi'-amar Watar | |
Yada'il Bayin I | |
Karib-il Bayin I | |
Dhamar 'Ali Watar | |
Samahu'Ali Yanuf II | c.545-c.525 |
Yathi'-amar Bayin II | c.525-c.495 |
Kariba-il I | |
Yada'il I | |
Yathi'-amar I | |
Kariba-il II | |
Samahu'Ali II | |
Yada'il II | |
Yathi'amar II | |
Yada'il Bayin II | |
Samahu'Ali Yanuf III | c.410-c.380 |
Yathi'-amar Watar I | |
Yaqrub Malik Darih | |
Samahu'Ali Yanuf IV | |
Yada'il Bayin III | |
Yaqrub Malik Watar I | |
Yathi'-amar Bayin III | |
Karib-il Watar II | c.320-c.270 |
Yada'il Bayin IV | |
Yaqrub Malik Watar II | |
Dhamar'Ali Yanuf | |
Yathi'-amar Bayin IV | |
Samahu'Ali Darih II | c.200-c.175 |
Karib-il Bayin II | |
Yathi'-amar III | |
unknown, c.140-c.116; to Himyar, 116-55 | |
Samahu'Ali Yanuf V | c.55 |
Yada'il Watar I | c.30 |
Dhamar'Ali Bayin I | c.25 |
Yadail Darih II | c.10 BC-c.10 AD |
Yathi'-amar Watar II | c.10-20 |
Yada'il Watar II | c.20-30 |
Dhamar 'Ali Bayin II | c.30-60 |
Karib-il Watar Yuhan'im | c.60-75 |
Dhamar'Ali Darih | c.75-85 |
Ilasharah Yahdub | c.85-100 |
to Himyar, Gurat, & Marib |
The early development of Saba' and the other states in the area was on the inland slopes of the mountains. The wadî dammed at Ma'rib thus flows into a desert basin; and the city of Ma'rib itself, capital of the Sabaeans, is at the foot of the mountains. Development occurred in this way because the caravan routes headed up inland. Even from later history it is noteworthy that Mecca, a caravan center itself, is well in from the coast. In three voyages between 117 and 109 BC, however, Eudoxus of Cyzicus is supposed to have learned how to use the monsoons to sail all the way from (Ptolemaic) Egypt to India and back. One might have suspected South Arabians to have known about this already, but the evidence that they didn't may be that the seaports in the region only developed subsequently. The caravan routes continued, but a sea trade developed that continued into the modern era -- later the lifeblood of realms like Oman.
Toward the end of this period, or right at the end, depending on the chronology, the Roman Emperor Augustus is supposed to have sent an expedition down to Arabia Felix under Gaius Aelius Gallus. According to Strabo, this was launched in 26 BC, but was treacherously guided by the Nabataean Syllaeus. The Romans suffered in the desert and did not arrive until the year 24. They were sick and wasted but nevertheless captured some cities and began besieging the city of Marsiaba. Lack of water prevented success, however, and Gallus had to retreat. No effort was made again to project Roman power or impose Roman sovereignty -- until Justinian found an ally nearby.
Dhu-Raydan/Himyar | |
---|---|
Haris ar-Ra'ish | c.120-c.90 BC |
Zu-l-Karnain | c.90-? |
Abrahah Zu-l-Mamur | |
Africis | |
Zu-l-Adjar | c.20 BC-10 AD |
Sharah-bil | |
Bilkis | |
Shammar Zarash | |
Abu Malik | |
Yasir Yuhasdiq | c.80-c.100 |
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir I | c.100-c.120 |
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | |
Shammar Yuharish I | ?-c.160 |
To Saba, c.160-c.195 | |
Laziz Yuhnaf Yuhasdiq | c.195-c.200 |
Yasir Yuhan'im I | |
Shammar Yuharish II | |
Kariba'il Yuhan'im | |
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | c.230-c.250 |
Dhamar 'Ali Watar Yuhabir II | |
Amdan Bayin Yuhagbid | |
Yasir Yuhanim II | |
Shamir Yuhar'ish III | c.290 |
Kingdom of Himyar & Saba' | |
---|---|
Nash'a-Karib Yamin Yuharhib | c.1 AD |
Watar Yuhamin | Era of Himyar, year 1 = 110 BC = -109 AD |
Yasir Yuhasdiq | |
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir I | |
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im | |
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir II | |
Dhamar 'Ali Bayin | |
Karib-il Watar | |
Halk-amar | |
Dhamar 'Ali Dharih | |
Yada'-il Watar | c.200-? |
Il-Adhdh Naufan Yuhasdiq | c.245-? |
Yasir Yuhan'im II | |
Shamir Yuhar'ish III | c.290 |
conquers Hadramawt; "King of Saba and Dhu Raydan and Hadramawt and Yamanat," 299 AD = 409 Era of Himyar | |
Yarim Yarhab | |
To Abyssinia, c.310-c.378 | |
Ela Amida of Axum | c.340-c.378 |
Malik-Karib Yuhamin | c.378-c.385 |
Abi-Karib As'ad (Kamil ut-Tubba) | c.385-c.420 |
accepts Judaism | |
Warau-amar Ayman (Hasan Yuhan'im) | c.420-c.433 |
Sharah-bil Ya'fur | c.433-? |
Ma'ad-Karib | |
'Abd-Kilal | |
Sharah-bil Yakuf | 464-? |
Nauf | |
Lahi-'Athra Yanuf | |
Marthad-ilan Yanuf | 496-? |
Ma'adi-Karib Ya'fur | c.500-c.517 |
invasion by Abyssinia | |
Masruq Dhu-Nuwas (Yusuf Ash'ar) | c.517-525 |
convert to Judaism, occupation by Abyssinia, 525-c.533 | |
Sumu-Yafa' Ashwa' (Esimfey, Esimiphaeus) | 526-c.533 |
Dhu Jadan of Himyar | 525-533 |
Abrahah (al-Ashram) of Abyssinia | c.533-570 |
Era of Himyar 669, 559 AD, last dated South Arabian text | |
Yaksum | 570-577 |
Masruq ibn Abraha (Ma'adi-Karib) | 577-587 |
Sayf ibn Dhi-Yazan (Abu Murra) | 587-599 |
installed by Persia; Persia rule, 599-629 | |
Khorre-Khusrau | 599-620 |
Badan | c.620-629 |
To Islam, 629 |
We now begin to get political events on a larger scale that impact South Arabia. While Abyssinia, apparently, hardly needed encouragement to project its power, it got some anyway. Its own conversion to Christianity went along with a process in which tribes and domains in Arabia converted both to Christianity and to Judaism. A number of Yemeni Kings converted to Judaism. This was annoying to the distant Roman Emperor Justinian, who encouraged the Ethiopians to do something about it. The complaint was that the Yemenis were persecuting Christians, but then persecution often accompanied perceptions that Christian were agents of Rome. Who was initially to blame for this is anyone's guess. Under the Sassanids, Armenians and other Christians were often suspect also.
The Ethiopian Emperor Ella Asbeha responded by invading Yemen, 523-525. The occupation lasted a few years longer, and an Abyssinian governor, Abrahah, later established himself in his own right -- though Hoyland describes him as installed by the Himyarites and merely tributary to Ethiopia. Attracting distant Roman attention, Yemen even became an object of more distant Persian interest. According to Hoyland, discontent with Ethiopian rule (by the son of Abrahah), let to solicitations of the Sassanid Shâh Khusro II to intervene. Where Alexander the Great had planned to conquer Arabia by sea, Khusro actually did so. At first installing his own candidate, outright conquest and Persian governors then followed (599). With this wrapped up, Khusro (temporarily) occupied Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor in a great (and foolish) war against Rome. While Heraclius defeated Khusro in the north, Persian domination in Yemen was brought to an end from a very different and portentous quarter -- the forces of the Prophet Muh.ammad.
No more profound a change would happen in the history of Yemen and South Arabia than would now happen. The language, the alphabet, the age old civilization of the happy South would disappear as the area would be assimilated to the ecumenical civilization of Islâm. Fortunately, much of what was distinctive would survive, under constant siege from Islâm, in the daughter civilization of Ethiopia. In its homeland, the Yemeni past would survive in legend, in ruins, and in some practices, but it would become something alien to the new values and beliefs.
In the final group of Yemeni Kings, the sequence of events narrated by Hoyland does not match very well the sequence in Gordon's king list. I have tried to tidy things up, but Hoyland's description isn't complete enough to know what all is going on in the list -- another case where I find myself frustrated and annoyed with historians who apparently don't think that their narrative histories need to be supplemented with chronological framework in tables or lists (or, when possible, genealogies). As already noted, Hoyland's opaque reference to "lists of Sabaean rulers" raises more questions than it answers.
The neglect this civilization still suffers is tragic. Part of the problem was the self-imposed isolation of the later Yemeni Kingdom, and then many years of political instability and civil war. Recently, however, a great deal of archaeology has been undertaken, and I have noticed much more about Yemen in documentaries at places like The History Channel than I have in accessible scholarly history books. Travel is now easier, despite some terrorism, and I have a friend who has inspected the ruins of the Ma'rib Dam. I trust that the archaeologists in the documentaries will eventually begin to fill in the gaps, clarify the uncertainties, and in general provide definitive histories of the area.
RASSIDS, 860-1226 | |
---|---|
al-Qâsim al-H.asanî ar-Rassî | d.860 |
al-H.usayn | |
Yah.yâ al-Hâdî ilâ 'l-H.aqq | 897-911 |
Muh.ammad al-Murtad.â | 911-913, d.922 |
Ah.mad an-Nâs.ir | 913-934 |
Yah.yâ | 934-956 |
Yûsuf al-Mans.ûr al-Dâ'î | 968-998,d.1012 |
al-Qâsim al-Mansur | 998-1003 |
al-H.usayn al-Mahdî | 1010-1013 |
Ja'far | 1022-1035 |
al-H.asan | 1035-1040 |
Abu'l-Fath. al-Daylamî an-Nâs.ir | 1045-1062? |
S.an'â' captured by S.ulayh.ids, 1062 | |
H.amza | ?-1066 |
al-Fâd.il | 1067-1068 |
Muh.ammad | ?-1085 |
Yah.yâ | 1117-1137 |
'Alî | 1137-1138 |
Ah.mad al-Mutawakkil | 1138-1171 |
Hamdânid occupation, 1171-1174, Ayyûbid occupation, 1174-1229 | |
'Abdallâh al-Mans.ûr | 1187-1217 |
Yah.yâ Najm ad-Dîn al-Hâdî ilâ'l-H.aqq | 1217 |
Muh.ammad 'Izz ad-Dîn an-Nâs.ir | 1217-1226 |
Rasûlids | |
Ah.mad al-Mahdî al-Mût.i' | 1248-1258 |
I have not given the dynasty of Hamdânids here because their predominance is brief.
AYYÛBIDS | |
---|---|
al-Mu'az.z.am Shams udDîn Tûrân Shâh | 1173-1181 d. 1186/7 |
al-'Azîz Zahir udDîn Tughtigin | 1181-1197 |
Mu'izz udDîn Ismâ'îl | 1197-1202 |
anNâs.ir | 1202-1214 |
alMu'az.z.am (alMuz.affar) Sulaymân | 1214-1215 d. 1251/2 |
al-Mas'ûd S.alâh. adDîn Yûsuf | 1215-1229 |
RASÛLIDS, at Ta'izz | |
---|---|
al-Mans.ûr 'Umar I Nûr adDîn | 1229-1250 |
al-Muz.affar Shams adDîn Yûsuf I | 1250-1295 |
al-Ashraf Mumahhid adDîn 'Umar II | 1295-1296 |
al-Mu'ayyad H.izabr adDîn Dâwûd | 1296-1322 |
al-Mujâhid Sayf ad-Dîn 'Alî | 1322-1363 |
al-Afd.al D.irghâm adDîn al-'Abbâs | 1363-1377 |
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl I | 1377-1400 |
an-Nâs.ir Salâh. adDîn Ah.mad | 1400-1424 |
al-Mans.ûr 'Abdallâh | 1424-1427 |
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl II | 1427-1428 |
az-Z.âhir Yah.yâ | 1428-1439 |
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl III | 1439-1442 |
al-Muz.affar Yûsuf II | 1442-1450/1 |
al-Afd.al Muh.ammad | 1442 |
an-Nâs.ir Ah.mad | 1442 |
al-Mas'ûd Salâh. adDîn | 1443-1454 |
al-Mu'ayyad al-H.usayn | 1451-1454 |
The chronology of the Rassids is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p.96]. The subsequent Islâmic dynasties are given by Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, which were initially transcribed but are here corrected and supplemented (as with diacritics) from Bosworth. The New Islamic Dynasties gives many other local dynasties, but here I have tried to confine things to a central succession.
T.ÂHIRIDS, at al-Miqrâna and Juban | |
---|---|
az-Z.âfir 'Âmir I Salâh. adDîn | 1454-1460 |
al-Mujâhid 'Alî Shams adDîn | 1454-1478 |
al-Mans.ûr 'Abd al-Wahhâb Tâj adDîn | 1478-1489 |
az-Z.âfir 'Âmir II Salâh. adDîn | 1489-1517 |
to Mamlûks, 1517, then Ottomans, 1517-1635 |
The Rasûlids are ultimately overthrown by a local, but still Sunni, family, the T.âhirids, a name that recalls an important family of the early days of the Abbasids. The T.âhirids now witness the epic arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (1498). Afonso d'Albuquerque sieged Aden in 1513. This alarmed the Mamlûks, who realized that their trade monopoly from the Mediterranean to India had been bypassed. They began moving against Yemen in 1515 and had occupied most of the country by 1517. Some T.âhirid princes survived in fortresses until 1538. However, it was not to be the Mamlûks who eliminated the holdouts. Just as the Mamlûks completed their conquest in South Arabia, Egypt itself was conquered by the Ottoman Sult.ân Selim I, "the Grim." Equally alert to the Portuguese threat, the Ottomans inherited the Mamlûk position in Yemen and, for a while, vigorously enlarged it. This also included intervention in the Horn of Africa, where the Portuguese had made contact with the long isolated Christian Emperors of Ethiopia. Portuguese firearms, delivered after an appeal for help by the Emperor Lebna Dengel in 1535, enabled the Emperor Galawedos to defeat and kill the Imâm of Harer, Ah.mad ibn Ibrahim, at the battle of Lake Tana in 1543. Like Ella Asbeha and Justinian many centuries earlier, in reverse, Ah.mad had been encouraged and supported by Süleymân the Magnificent to move against Ethiopia. After this epic event, Ottoman interest began to wane and the Turkish grip in Yemen slacken -- though they only entered S.an'â' itself in 1547.
QÂSIMIDS | |
---|---|
al-Qâsim I al-Mans.ûr | c.1592/97-1620 |
Muh.ammad I al-Mu'ayyad | 1620-1644 |
S.an'â' occupied, 1629; Ottomans ejected, 1635 | |
Ismâ'îl al-Mutawakkil | 1644-1676 |
Ah.mad I al-Mahdî | 1676-1681 |
Muh.ammad II al-Mutawakkil | 1681-1686 |
Muh.ammed III an-Nâs.ir al-Hâdi | 1686-1718 |
al-Qâsim II al-Wutawakkil | 1718-1727 |
al-H.usayn al-Mans.ûr | 1727-1748 |
al-'Abbâs I al-Mahdî | 1748-1775 |
'Alî I al-Mans.ûr | 1775-1806 |
Ah.mad II al-Mahdî | 1806-1808 |
Ah.mad III al-Mutawakkil | 1808-1816 |
'Abdallâh I al-Mahdî | 1816-1835 |
'Alî II al-Mans.ûr | 1835-1837, 1844-1845, 1849-1850, 1857 |
'Abdallâh II an-Nâs.ir | 1837-1840 |
Muh.ammed IV al-Hâdî | 1840-1844 |
Muh.ammed V al-Mutawakkil | 1845-1849 |
Ottoman attack on S.an'â', 1849 | |
'Abbâs II al-Mu'ayyad | 1850 |
Ghâlib al-Hâdî | 1850-1857 |
Civil War, 1857-1871; to Ottomans, 1871-1918 | |
Muh.ammed VI al-Mans.ûr | 1890-1904 |
Yah.yâ al-Mutawakkil | 1904-1948 |
Independent Kingdom, 1918 | |
'Abdallâh (III) al-Hâdî | 1948 |
Ah.mad (III) an-Nâs.ir | 1948-1962 |
Muh.ammad al-Mans.ûr al-Badr | 1962, d. 1996 |
the United Arab Republic, 1958-1961; Civil War, 1962-1970; Republic, 1962-present |
By the middle of the 19th century there are serious problems. The Turks, despite their general lethargy, are back, and the Wahhâbîs, no doubt taking strong objection to Yemeni Shi'ism, are intervening also. Between civil war and invasion, the Ottomans end up annexing the country again by 1871. But, again, their rule tends to lapse into local control, and the Imâms, whose hold on the countryside had never been entirely broken, reemerged, at least as vassals, in 1890. This was the situation when World War I shattered Ottoman power at its source. Yemen was simply cut loose, and the Imâm becomes the King of Yemen.
After another bit of conservative and Tibetan isolation, the winds of change arrive again. Yemen joined the Arab League in 1945 and then the United Arab Republic, with Egypt and Syria, in 1958. Meanwhile, the substantial Jewish population of Yemen, under increasing persecution, largely decamped to Palestine and then Israel. The King withdrew from the UAR in 1961 but then was overthrown by the Nassarite army the following year. As before, this did not break the power of the dynasty, and a long civil war followed, with the King supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Nassarites by, naturally, the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser died in 1970, but, with 150,000 dead, the King gave up and went into exile. Meanwhile, things got more complicated when the British left Aden in 1967. The new People's Republic of South Yemen soon lapsed into civil war itself and was restyled the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen when the more radical Marxists, i.e. the Communists, won the war in 1970. Bubbling with violence, the radicals kept attacking the Yemen Arab Republic, to which 300,000 refugees, disillusioned with Marxism, fled, and war broke out between them in 1979. In 1990 this got resolved by the actual unification of North and South -- now simply known as the Republic of Yemen. The unification came apart in another brief civil war, 1994-95, but things got patched back together again. Although now friendly with the West, the country became the scene for one of the Islamist terror attacks leading up to 9/11 -- the bombing of the United States destroyer Cole on 12 October 2000 in Aden harbor. Where the "Democratic Republic" had invited Soviet troops in during the 1970's, American forces now help hunt down al-Qaeda members.
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Islâmic Index
Philosophy of History
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Copyright (c) 2005 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
MODERN ISLÂM
Ottoman successor regimes in the Central Islamic lands, with some states that were never Ottoman (like Oman) but rode out the Colonial period into significant contemporary roles. Iran is listed separately, though it definitely falls into the latter category. Morocco alone of the Arab world retains a genuinely Mediaeval monarchy.
SULT.ÂNS OF OMAN AND ZANZIBAR | |||
---|---|---|---|
Ah.mad ibn Sa'îd | c. 1754-1783 | ||
Sa'îd ibn Ah.mad | 1783-1786 | ||
H.âmid ibn Sa'îd | 1786-1792 | ||
Sult.ân ibn Ah.mad | 1792-1806 | ||
Treaty with British East India Company, 1798 | |||
Sâlim ibn Sult.ân | 1806-1821 | ||
Sa'îd ibn Sult.ân | 1806-1856 | ||
OMAN | ZANZIBAR | ||
Thuwaynî ibn Sa'îd | 1856-1866 | Majîd ibn Sa'îd | 1856-1870 |
Sâlim ibn Thuwaynî | 1866-1868 | ||
'Azzân ibn Qays | 1868-1870 | ||
Turkî ibn Sa'îd | 1870-1888 | Barghash ibn Sa'îd | 1870-1888 |
Fays.al ibn Turkî | 1888-1913 | Khalîfa ibn Barghash | 1888-1890 |
British Protectorate, 1890 | |||
'Alî ibn Sa'îd | 1890-1893 | ||
H.âmid ibn Thuwaynî | 1893-1896 | ||
H.ammûd ibn Muh.ammad | 1896-1902 | ||
'Alî ibn H.ammûd | 1902-1911 | ||
Taymûr ibn Fays.al | 1913-1932 | Khalîfa ibn Kharûb | 1911-1960 |
Sa'îd ibn Taymûr | 1932-1970 | ||
'Abdallâh ibn Khalîfa | 1960-1963 | ||
Jamshîd ibn 'Abdallâh | 1963-1964 | ||
Independent, 1963; Sult.ân Overthown in Coup, 1964 | |||
End of British Protection, 1967 | linked to Tanganyika as Republic of Tanzania, 1964-present | ||
Qâbûs ibn Sa'îd | 1970-present |
BRUNEI, Bendaharas | |
---|---|
Muhammad | c.1514 |
Ahmad | c.1521 |
Sharif 'Ali | c.1526 |
Sulaiman | |
Bolkiah | |
Abdul Qahhar | d.1578 |
Saif ur-Rijal | c.1578-c.1590 |
Shah Brunei | c.1590 |
Raja Ghafur | c.1600 |
Muhammad Hassan | regent, 1601-1617 |
Abdul-Jalil Akbar | 1617-c.1637 |
Abdul-Jalilul Jabbar | c.1637-c.1642 |
Haji Muhammed 'Ali | c.1642-c.1648 |
Abdul Hakk Mubin | c.1648-1655 |
Muhyid-Din | 1655-c.1670 |
Nasrud-Din Husin Kamaluddin | 1670-1680 |
Muhammad Aliud-Din | c.1680-c.1690 |
civil war, c.1690-c.1750 | |
Omar 'Ali Saif ud-Din I | c.1750-1780, d.1795 |
Muhammed Tajud-Din | 1780-1792, 1793-1806 |
Muhammed Jamal ul-'Alam | 1792-1793 |
Muhammed Khanzul Alam | 1806-1822 |
Raja Api | 1822 |
Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din II Djamal ul-Din | 1822-1852 |
Abdul-Mumin | 1852-1885 |
Hashim Jalilul 'Alam Akam ud-Din | 1885-1906 |
British Protectorate, 1888-1984, British Resident, 1906 | |
Muhammed Jamalul 'Alam II | 1906-1924 |
Ahmad Tajud-Din | 1924-1941, 1945-1950 |
Japanese occupation, 1941-1945 | |
Sir Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din III | 1950-1967, d. 1986 |
Sir Hassanul-Bolkiah | 1967-present |
SARAWAK, BROOKE | |
---|---|
James | 1841-1868 |
Charles Anthony | 1868-1917 |
Charles Vyner | 1917-1942, 1945-1946, d.1963 |
Japanese occupation, 1942-1945; Great Britain, 1946-1957; Malaya, 1957-1963; Malaysia, 1963-present |
Then, since the place had been so thoroughly trashed by the Japanese, C.V. Brooke ceded it to Britain. Although the Brookes were not Moslems, their subjects were, and Sarawak eventually became part of the very Moslem country of Malaysia.
The list is from Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies and Chester L. Krause and Clifford Mishler, the Standard Catalog of World Coins [Colin R. Bruce II, editor, Krause Publications, Iola, Wisconsin, 1982, p.1227].
Islâmic Index
The Hashemites, 1827-present
When I lived in Beirut in 1969-70, one of the principal locations in the city was a large square downtown. It was a transportation hub. Busses and taxis left from there for Damascus and elsewhere. The place itself was commonly called the "Bourj," which means "tower." There was no tower, but evidently there had been, and the name had stuck. The official name was the "Places des Martyrs," which at the time seemed to be about something else equally non-existent, since my fellow students and I could not imagine what kind of "martyrs" there ever could have been in Lebanese history. As it turned out, there were indeed martyrs, but it was not just in Lebanese history. On August 21, 1915, eleven suspected Arab nationalist leaders were hung on that very site in Beirut, oddly called "Liberty Square" at the time, by the Turkish military authorities, under Jemal Pasha. On May 6, 1916, the Turks executed twenty-one others, seven in Damascus and fourteen in Beirut. On hearing the news of the latter, Prince Fays.al, son of the Sharîf H.usayn of Mecca, who was visiting near Damascus, is supposed to have thrown down his headress and exclaimed, "Death has become sweet, Oh Arabs!" Fays.al returned to Mecca, and the Arab Revolt against the Turks, long in preparation by Fays.al's father, commenced on the 5th of June.
Prince Fays.al and the Sharîf H.usayn were Hashemites, i.e. were supposed to be descendants of the Prophet Muh.ammad. At right is the complete genealogy of this descent, as reported by the family itself. I have derived this from a curious source, a book called A Prince of Arabia, the Amir Shereef Ali Haider, by George Stitt [George Allen & Unwin, London, 1948 -- this is from the personal historical library of my friend Tom Dunlap]. Ali Haider was from the senior or Zaidi branch of the Hashemite family, who had supplied most of the Amirs or Sharifs of Mecca until 1882, when the junior or 'Awni branch took over. When H.usayn revolted against the Turks in 1916, Ali Haider was appointed in his place by the Ottoman Sultân. Ali Haider was never able to go to Mecca and exercised no real authority under the Turks. His son did end up marrying the granddaughter of the Ottoman Sultân Murad V (1876). Histories of the period or the area rarely mention him. Unfortunately, the book about him from 1948 uses Anglicized versions of the Arabic names. I have not supplied the proper transcriptions for all the names. Other information here is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996], and from George Antonius, The Arab Awakening [1946, Capricorn Books, New York, 1965].
The romance of the Arab Revolt, with Lawrence of Arabia and all, and its success in sweeping all the way to Damascus, as the British advanced into Palestine, came to be fully balanced by bitterness at the British betrayal of assurances for Arab independence after the war. The British had made promises elsewhere, to the French and to the Zionists, and not a lot of care had been taken in the desperate days of the war to keep all these undertakings consistent with each other. Initially, the worse betrayal seemed to be over Syria. With Fays.al in possession of Damascus, he was elected King of Syria in 1920; but in short order the French, to whom the British had handed control of Lebanon, as they had honestly warned the Arabs they would, moved in force to occupy Damascus and the rest of Syria, which the British had agreed with them, but not with the Arabs, that they could do. Fays.al was tossed out. The French commemorated this victory by carving a stele in the rock at the Nahr al-Kalb (the Dog River) in Lebanon, joining earlier stelae by the Egyptians, Assyrians, and others. After the Vichy French were overthrown in Lebanon and Syria, in turn, in World War II, the stele naturally was attacked and mutilated beyond recognition.
The Hâshimites, 1827 AD-present | |
---|---|
Mecca and H.ijâz | |
'Abd al-Mut.t.alib | Sharîf of Mecca, 1827, 1851-1856, 1880-1882 |
Muh.ammad | 1827-1851, 1856-1858 |
'Abdullâh | 1858-1877 |
al-H.usayn | 1877-1880 |
'Awn al-Rafîq | 1882-1905 |
'Alî | 1905-1908 |
H.usayn | 1908-1916 |
Arab Revolt against Turkey, 1916-1918 | |
King, 1916-1925 | |
Caliph, 1924-1925, d. 1931 | |
'Ali | King, 1925, d. 1934 |
Overthrown by Ibn Sa'ûd | |
"Greater Syria" | |
Fays.al | King, 1920 |
Overthrown by France | |
Iraq, British Mandate | |
Fays.al I | King, 1921-1933 |
Independence, end of British Mandate, 1932 | |
Ghâzî | 1933-1939 |
Fays.al II | 1939-1958 |
pro-German coup suppressed, 1941; King overthrown & killed in Coup, 1958 | |
Transjordan, British Mandate | |
'Abdullâh I | Amîr, 1921-1946 |
End of British Mandate, 1946 | |
King, 1946-1951, assassinated | |
Arab Legion enters Palestine, 1948; Kingdom of Jordan, annexation of the West Bank, 1949 | |
T.alâl | 1951-1952, d. 1972 |
H.usayn | 1952-1999 |
Six Day War, Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, 1967; "Black September," Palestinian guerrillas ousted from Jordan, 1970; peace treaty with Israel, 1994 | |
'Abdullâh II | 1999- |
One of H.usayn's other sons, 'Abdullâh, even led a small force north, evidently to contest Syria with the French. However, before 'Abdullâh crossed the French border, he was persuaded that perhaps he should stay where he was, just across the Jordan River, in a area of vague jurisdiction. This was at the time considered part of Syria, but the French evidently had no use for it, and its proximity to Palestine put it more or less in the British sphere of influence. So 'Abdullâh settled down as the Amîr of the Transjordan, filling in the space between British Palestine and British Iraq.
This did not improve the humor of 'Abdullâh's father, whose leadership turned out to be not much better than his diplomacy. When Kemal Attatürk abolished the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 (the Sult.ânate had already been abolished in 1922), H.usayn decided that if it was anyone's business to be Caliph, it was his. Indeed, the last bona fide Abbasid Caliph had been carted off to Constantinople in 1517, and it was only after three hundred years or so that the Ottoman Sult.âns began to claim that the office had been passed on to them. This unlikely and irregular transmission, however, eventually came to be accepted by many Moslems, and the abolition of the office left Islâm without somebody to claim it for the first time in Islâmic history. From a dynasty that had served as the Guardians of the Holy Cities for some time, and which was accepted as belonging to the Hashimite clan of the Prophet himself, it must have seemed quite reasonable to H.usayn, as it still seems fairly reasonable in retrospect, that the office should fall to him.
At the time, however, nobody was buying this, and H.usayn's reputation was badly damaged. Ibn Sa'ûd and his Wahhabi fundamentalists began protesting and threatening, and H.usayn had put himself in no good position to resist them. When consensus is so important in the tradition of Islâmic Law, H.usayn would have been better advised to first solicit opinions from respected jurists about whether there needed to be a Caliph, who would be appropriate for it, etc. In 1925 he abdicated in favor of his eldest son 'Alî, but this did not stop Ibn Sa'ûd. The H.ijâz soon joined the Sa'ûdî central Arabian domain of Najd in the new Kingdom of Sa'ûdî Arabia. Then Ibn Sa'ûd's British subsidies soon gave way to income of a different sort, when vast oil reserves were discovered under the Arabian sands. But H.usayn and 'Alî could only flee to the welcome of 'Abdullâh's court in the Transjordan to live out the rest of their lives.
Britain's other conflicting promises, over Palestine, prepared the way for the most dangerous and intractable problem in all of 20th Century politics, diplomacy, and war, as Jewish colonists sought, and achieved, the creation of a Jewish State, Israel, in Palestine. The best showing by an Arab army in the 1948 war was, ironically, the British commanded Arab Legion of 'Abdullâh, at that point King of the Transjordan. Yet 'Abdullâh had no particular animus against either Jews or Zionists, and rumor maintains that in a secret meeting with Golda Meir he actually proposed some kind of condominium over Palestine between the Zionists and himself. This was rejected, but then 'Abdullâh subsequently annexed the Palestinian territory that he ended up occupying, creating simply the Kingdom of (the) Jordan. Since the Palestinian fire-eaters were all ready to found their own radical Palestinian republic in the land preserved from Israel, this move earned 'Abdullâh his own assassination. Now, ironically, by conquering Jordanian Palestine in 1967, the Israelis have ended up with the fire-eaters in their own house, setting off bombs.
The throne of Jordan soon passed over 'Abdullâh's mentally incompetent son T.alâl to his grandson H.usayn. In 1999, H.usayn, having endured every war, revolution, and upheaval since, died after a long fight with cancer. Thus passed a man of astonishing durability in the merciless politics of the Middle East, although hated by many Arabs for his suppression of armed Palestinian organizations in Jordan (in "Black September"). H.usayn, the namesake of his great-grandfather and eyewitness to his grandfather's assassination, was the last living link to the Arab Revolt. Although he was long denigrated as a reactionary, who wasn't in tune with all the great new Marxist Arab Nationalism of the 50's, 60's, and 70's, H.usayn survived into a era when it is hard to tell the Marxists from the Mujâhidûn (Islâmic fighters in the Holy War), and where the folly of each is, or should be, fairly obvious. To everyone's surprise, H.usayn had, just a couple weeks before his death, disinherited his brother H.assan, the Crown Prince for 34 years, and left the Throne to his son 'Abdullâh, who thus becomes King 'Abdullâh II of Jordan. (One hopes this was not entirely a surprise to H.assan.) H.usayn's second cousin, King Fays.al II of Iraq, unfortunately, was overthrown and murdered in 1958, sending Iraq down a path to a despotism which it was doomed to long endure. Only now, in 2003, after three wars, has the dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, been overthrown, thanks to an American and British invasion of the country.
The 1st Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1980, hoping to seize the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab (the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates) from Irân, whose military had been weakened by purges of the Shah's officers. By 1982 the Iranians managed, with suicidal "human wave" attacks, to throw Hussein back, and he was willing to call it quits; but the Ayatollah Khomeini refused to let up. It didn't do much good, and, even though Khomeini said he would rather "drink poison," he finally accepted a ceasefire in 1988. The 2nd Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1990, invading and occupying Kuwait. Just a year later a coalition of American, Arab, and European forces threw Hussein out of Kuwait. Although warned that it might precipitate a global ecological disaster, Hussein ordered the torching of over 600 oil wells as Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait. Fortunately, although it was a terrible mess, the disaster was of more limited consequence. Iraqi territory itself was not occupied, and revolts by Shi'ites in the south of Iraq and Kurds in the north were brutally suppressed by Hussein. Iraq subsequently was under UN sanctions until the destruction of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs could be certified. American and British air power patrolled "no fly zones" in the north and south of the country. This didn't really make much difference in the south, but in the north it protected what had become an autonomous Kurdish domain. UN inspectors could not certify that Hussein had destroyed his unconventional weapons, and they even left the country in 1998 after Iraqi non-cooperation. In 2003, the 3rd Gulf War was initiated by the United States and Britain, principally, with the determination, apparently, that it was simply high time to resolve the matter and get rid of Hussein -- especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Hussein was overthrown, later captured, tried, and finally executed -- shamefully taunted at his hanging by Shi'ite executioners.
Iraq itself, however, although now (2007) with a democratically elected government, in which all groups managed to participate, nevertheless is a place of constant violence. The Sunni minority, with Baathist diehards, began an "uprising" rather than live under governments dominated by the Shi'ite majority. Although this is portrayed, often by Western sympathizers, as a national struggle against American occupation, most of the casualties have been civilian victims of suicide bombers and car bombs. There have also been attacks against Islamic sites, like the Golden Mosque in Samara, which was associated with Shi'ism. These tactics in part are the inspiration of al-Qa'ida and effected by an influx of foreign Jihadists. Substantial parts of the Sunni community are now tiring of this, especially since the Shi'ites have answered in kind, with help from the Shi'ite motherland, Iran. Since the Shi'ites and Iran have little more sympathy for America than they do for the Sunnis, American (and British) forces tend to get caught in the middle. Nevertheless, it is the interest of the West, the International Community, and Iraq that neither Sunnis nor Shi'ites have an outright victory, and the only way to prevent that and mediate a settlement is for a third party (the Americans) to maintain the balance. Meanwhile, the Kurds, although provoking Turkey by supporting Kurdish terrorists there, have been relatively safe and prosperous in their part of Iraq -- now behind a dike to inhibit terrorist infiltration. They have even paid for commercials on American television with thanks for American efforts. With many in American politics cynically and opportunistically hoping to benefit from a defeat in Iraq, however, as they benefited from defeat in Vietnam (along with Isolationists and simple anti-American Leftists), those efforts may not continue much longer. Meanwhile, all the major communities seem to have joined in an ethnic purge of Iraqi Christians, the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans and Assyrians. As with the persecution of Christians anywhere, this draws little attention from the Western Press (whose template is that Christians are as bad as Muslim Jihadists), and the numbers of Iraqi Christians are too small to figure in most geopolitical calculations.
Note on the modern Assyrians
The whole area around the Bourj in Beirut was destroyed in the Lebanese civil war of the 70's and 80's. Plenty of new martyrs were created, though it is not clear what the cause was supposed to be when the Lebanese largely destroyed their own country and slaughtered each other, opening the door to a Syrian occupation of much of the country, something that no Lebanese of any faction really wanted. After some years of relative peace, chaos has returned as Syria evidently continues to promote its interests (starting with key assassinations) and both radicalized Shi'ites and Sunni Jihadists display little desire to live peaceful, ordinary lives.
Islâmic Index
Modern Morocco and Tunisia
1640-present
The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, & Kings of Morocco | |
---|---|
Muh.ammad ash-Sharîf | 1631-1659 |
Muh.ammad I | 1635-1664 |
ar-Rashîd | 1666-1672 |
Ismâ'îl | Sult.ân, 1672-1727 |
Ah.mad | 1727-1728, 1728-1729 |
'Abd al-Malik | 1728 |
'Abd Allâh | 1729-1734, 1736, 1740-1741, 1741-1742, 1743-1747, 1748-1757 |
'Alî | 1734-1736 |
Muh.ammad II | 1736-1738 |
al-Mustad.î' | 1738-1740, 1742-1743, 1747-1748, d.1760 |
Zayn al-'Abidîn | 1741 |
Muh.ammad III | 1757-1790 |
Yazîd | 1790-1792 |
Hishâm | 1792-1798, d.1799 |
Sulaymân | 1798-1822 |
'Abd ar-Rahmân | 1822-1859 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1859-1873 |
al-H.asan I | 1873-1894 |
'Abd al-'Azîz | 1894-1908, d.1943 |
'Abd al-H.âfiz. | 1908-1912, d.1937 |
French Protectorate, 1912-1956 | |
Yûsuf | 1912-1927 |
Muh.ammad V | 1927-1953, 1955-1957, King, 1957-1961 |
Muh.ammad VI | 1953-1955, d.1976 |
al-H.asan II | 1961-1999 |
Muh.ammad VII | 1999-present |
The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia | |
---|---|
H.usayn I | 1705-1735 |
'Alî I | 1735-1756 |
Muh.ammad I | 1756-1759 |
'Alî II | 1759-1782 |
H.amûda | 1782-1814 |
'Uthmân | 1814 |
Mah.mûd | 1814-1824 |
H.usayn II | 1824-1835 |
Mus.t.afâ | 1835-1837 |
Ah.mad I | 1837-1855 |
Muh.ammad II | 1855-1859 |
Muh.ammad III as-S.âdiq | 1859-1882 |
French Occupation, 1881-1883; Protectorate, 1883-1956 | |
'Alî III | 1882-1902 |
Muh.ammad IV | 1902-1906 |
Muh.ammad V | 1906-1922 |
Muh.ammad VI al-H.abîb | 1922-1929 |
Ah.mad II | 1929-1942 |
Muh.ammad VII al-Muns.if | 1942-1943, d.1948 |
Muh.ammad VIII | 1943-1957, d.1962 |
Rashâd al-Mahdî | King, 1957 |
Republic of Tunisia, 1957-present |
The Moroccan experience was different. While France moved steadily to consolidate its influence, this was not without complaint from other European powers. World War I nearly started early with the Agadir incident in 1911, as Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II offered hope that Germany would dispute any French designs on the Sultânate. As it happened, the War waited a couple more years and a French Protectorate was nevertheless imposed in 1912. Morocco then later became the scene of the mythic presence of "Rick" in the classic movie Casblanca, not far from the real life drama of American troops landing in November 1942, to precipitate French North Africa back into World War II against Germany. The Germans chased out, Morocco became the first French possession to regain independence, not in the dangerous grip of nationalist ideology, but still under the control of the traditional monarchy, the only such traditional national monarchy surviving in the Arab world from the Middle Ages.
Morocco and Tunisia now look like islands of bliss in comparison to Algeria, where dictatorship was supposed to end with elections, but then, when the elections went to Islâmic fundamentalists, the army set them aside in favor of a more moderate dictatorship. The result has been a particularly nasty kind of civil war, in which whole villages have been massacred by forces that don't even acknowledge which side they are fighting for. This frightening and perplexing dilemma is beginning to seem all too common in the Islâmic world, where the most vicious radicals nevertheless seem to command genuine popularity and prestige. It is thus an example of the challenge of Islamic Fascism that is beginning to characterize our era.
These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002]. The 'Alawid Sharîfs and H.usaynid Beys are treated by both sources. Morby has a clearer presentation, but Bosworth also has a brief discussion of the history.
Islâmic Index
The House of Su'ûd & Saudi Arabia,
1735-present
The House of Su'ûd | |
---|---|
Su'ûd ibn Muh.ammad | Amîr of Dir'iyya, d.1735 |
Muh.ammad I | 1735-1765 |
'Abd al-'Azîz I | 1765-1803 |
Su'ûd I | 1803-1814 |
'Abdallâh I | 1814-1819 |
Egyptian Occupation, 1818-1822 | |
Turkî | 1822-1834 |
Mushârî | 1834 |
Fays.al I | 1834-1838, 1843-1865 |
Egyptian Occupation, 1838-1843 | |
Khâlid I | Vassal of Egypt, 1838-1841 |
'Abdallâh II | Vassal of Egypt, 1841-1843 |
'Abdallâh III | 1865-1871, 1874?-1887 |
governor, 1887-1889 | |
Su'ûd II | 1871-1874 |
Muh.ammad II | 1887 |
Conquest and rule by Rashîdîs, 1887-1902 | |
'Abd al-Rah.mân | governor, 1889-1891 |
Muh.ammad III | governor, 1891 |
Direct rule by Rashîdîs, 1891-1902 | |
'Abd al-'Azîz II | Amîr, 1902-1926; King of Najd and H.ijâz, 1926-1932; King of Sa'ûdî Arabia, 1932-1952 |
Su'ûd III | 1952-1964 |
Fays.al II | 1964-1975 |
Khâlid II | 1975-1982 |
Fahd | 1982-2005 |
'Abdallâh IV | 2005- |
Despite incredible wealth, kicked into overdrive by the Arab oil boycott in 1973, Sa'ûdî Arabia remained deeply conservative and religiously fundamentalist, as in the early days of the Wahhâbîs. Alcohol is prohibited in the Kingdom. Women cannot drive cars without the company of a man. Nor can women work in mixed company or appear on television without a veil. The full rigors of Islâmic law mean that fornication (let alone adultery) can be punished by death (beheading) and theft by the amputation of a hand. A special religious police force looks after moral improprieties, including even excessive laughter in one's home.
The rigors of Islâm, however, did not necessarily strike other Arabs as the most objectionable thing about Sa'ûdî Arabia. Revolutions in Iraq, Syria, and especially Egypt, with promulgation of ideologies like Nasser's "Arab socialism," led to the desire and expectation that the "reactionary regimes," i.e. monarchies and pro-Western governments, would eventually all be swept away. The Sa'ûdîs had some natural advantages against this. 'Abd al-'Azîz begat literally dozens of children, and this formed a tight family corporation for the control of the country. At the same time, the Nasserites and socialists, by their close association with the Soviet Union, handed the Sa'ûdîs a powerful card: the atheism of the Communists, of no particular concern to Nasser, was anathema to the fundamentalists. For many years beyond the time it made the slightest bit of sense, the Kingdom always linked Israel and the Soviets as the twin pillars of Communist atheism.
In more institutional terms, since a military coup was always the most serious threat to a Middle Eastern state, the Sa'ûdîs created two entirely separate military establishments, the regular military and a national guard, that could serve as checks on each other. The Kingdom thus rode out the high tide of Arab revolution. As Egypt and Jordan made peace with Israel, and then Iraq threatened the Sa'ûdîs with a surprise conquest of Kuwait (another "reactionary" Emirate), the Kingdom found itself in a grand alliance of Egypt, Syria, Britain, France, and the United States to liberate Kuwait. Meanwhile, a threat to the Sa'ûdîs had come from a very different kind of revolution, the Iranian upheaval of the Ayatollah Khomeini. With the beginning of the Islamic year 1400, in December 1979, Iranian inspired fanatics took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, which houses the Ka'aba, the House of God, built by Abraham, the most sacred place in all of Islâm. A bloody firefight, damaging the building, was necessary to defeat the fanatics. Henceforth, Iranians were closely watched and controlled while on pilgrimage (nothing new, actually, in Orthodox Mecca, where Richard Burton, impersonating a Moslem, observed much the same thing in the 19th century).
In 2001, the Sa'ûdîs, still ruled by sons of 'Abd al-'Azîz (he had 43 of them, from 1900 to 1947), seemed secure enough. When OPEC drives up oil prices, the Kingdom wins browny points with the West (and makes extra money) by underselling Cartel prices. Conservative Islâm is under no threat from any non-Western sources, though the occasional wild Prince, like the one with the nude statuary with painted pubic hair at his house in Beverly Hills, must be intensely embarrassing. I always wonder about the Sa'ûdî girls I knew in Beirut in 1969-1970, who used to change into see-through blouses on the flights from Jiddah to Beirut. Either they live a private life secure from the religious police (police invasions of domestic privacy common in the West would provoke serious bloodshed in Arabia), or they have moved to the West. As conservative guardians of the Holy Cities of Islâm, Sa'ûdî Arabia is probably in an ideologically position stronger than for most of the 20th century. Islâm everywhere has tended to gravitate toward the Wahhâbî positions, rather than away from them.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11/2001 put conservative Islâm in a somewhat different light. Sa'ûdî subsidies to Islamic schools in countries like Pakistan have helped breed a generation of fanatics with a great hatred of modernity and the West. The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama ben Ladin, was himself a Sa'ûdî millionaire, stripped of his citizenship, who had created a state-within-a-state in T.âlibân Afghanistian. T.âlibân itself ominously means "students," i.e. students from the Pakistani Islâmic schools. The Sa'ûdîs are (officially) mortified by all this; but many Americans, particularly but not exclusively those sympathetic to Israel, are suddenly suspicious of a presumably friendly regime whose consistent actions have tended, not surprisingly, to promote anti-Americanism. There is undoubtedly an inner inconistency in Sa'ûdî policy, which is overtly friendly, indeed dependent (with American troups stationed in the country), with the country whose culture represents the whole threat of freedom and modernity to Wahhâbî conservatism and the theocratic aspect of the Sa'ûdî state. Where previously the threat to the Sa'ûdî state had been from the Left, things like Nasser's "Arab Socialism," now the threat may be from the Right, from people who view any remnant of secular pragmatism and Realpolitik in Sa'ûdî policy as irreligious -- the people who have created the present ideology of Islamic Fascism. This is an unusual position for the House of Su'ûd, and it may force some unpleasant choices upon them.
Islâmic Index
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Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
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